Sunday, 31 July 2022

Queen of Crime

Agatha Christie at home
Christie at her home in Devon, in 1974.Photograph by Lord Snowdon / Camera Press / Retna

They are assembled—maybe eight or nine people—in a small place: a snowbound train, a girls’ school, an English country house. Then—oh no! A body drops. Who did this? And why, and how? Among those gathered, or soon summoned, is a detective, who says that no one should leave, please. He then begins questioning the people concerned, one by one. In the end, he collects all the interested parties and delivers the “revelation”: he names the murderer and the motive and the method. Almost never does the culprit protest. Occasionally, he goes off and commits suicide, but as a rule he confesses (“God rot his soul in Hell! I’m glad I did it!”) and exits quietly, under police escort. Anyone who has ever seen a Charlie Chan movie, or played Clue, or, indeed, read a detective story of the past half century will recognize this scenario, created by Agatha Christie, the so-called Queen of Crime, in the nineteen-twenties.

The detective story was invented by Edgar Allan Poe, though he wrote only four of them before he lost interest. Other writers picked up where he left off, but the first “career” practitioner of the genre who is still important to us today is Arthur Conan Doyle, whose Sherlock Holmes series appeared from 1887 to 1927. By Christie’s time, at least two conventions had been established. First was the detective’s eccentricity. (Holmes, when he is not chasing a criminal, lies on his couch, felled by boredom and cocaine, shooting bullets into the wall of his study.) A second rule was the absolutely central role of ratiocination. The detective, when he is working, shows almost no emotion. What he shows—and what constitutes the main pleasure of the stories—is inductive reasoning.

Christie, who began publishing detective fiction thirty-three years after Conan Doyle, generally followed these rules, but she elaborated on them, creating the scenario described above—the small place, the interrogations, the revelation—and used it, fairly consistently, in sixty-six detective novels published between 1920 and 1976. According to a number of sources, her books, in the approximately forty-five languages they have been translated into, have sold more than two billion copies, making her the most widely read novelist in history. There is also a continuing output of books about Christie. In the past year, we got two more: “Duchess of Death: The Unauthorized Biography of Agatha Christie” (Phoenix; $25.95), by Richard Hack, who has previously written lives of Michael Jackson and J. Edgar Hoover, among others; and “Agatha Christie’s Secret Notebooks: Fifty Years of Mysteries in the Making” (HarperCollins; $25.99), by John Curran, a devout fan. With Christie, then, we are dealing not so much with a literary figure as with a broad cultural phenomenon, like Barbie or the Beatles.

Christie was born in 1890 and grew up in a large house in Torquay, a seaside resort in Devon. Her father, Frederick Miller, had a modest inheritance, and it sufficed. In her 1977 autobiography, published posthumously, Christie describes her father’s day: “He left our house in Torquay every morning and went to his club. He returned, in a cab, for lunch, and in the afternoon went back to the club, played whist all afternoon, and returned to the house in time to dress for dinner.” She adds, “He had no outstanding characteristics.” Her mother, Clara, did have characteristics. She wrote poetry, and she was interested in the soul. During Agatha’s youth, Clara went through Unitarianism, Theosophy, and Zoroastrianism. Agatha adored her, and spent hours poring over her jewelry and ribbons.

When Agatha was a child, she had no companions to speak of. Her sister and brother, Madge and Monty, were more than a decade older. She had no schoolmates, either, because, for the most part, she didn’t go to school. (She taught herself, out of books.) She was paralyzingly shy; even as an adult, she wrote, she could hardly bring herself to enter a shop. Her social world consisted mainly of the family’s three servants. She also communed, for long periods every day, with imaginary companions: kings, kittens, chickens. Enthusiastically morbid, she adored funerals, and often went to put flowers on the grave of her late canary, Kiki. “I had a very happy childhood,” she wrote.

In one respect, it was not happy. When Agatha was five, Frederick was informed that, apparently as a result of mismanagement, there was almost no money left in his estate. He tried to find a job, but, Christie wrote, “like most of his contemporaries”—she means contemporaries of his class—he “was not trained for anything.” He died young (fifty-five) and discouraged. Agatha and her mother soldiered on. Dinner was often rice pudding.

As a young woman, Agatha had no thought of a career. All she wanted was a husband, and when she was twenty-four she got one: the dashing Archie Christie, a member of the Royal Flying Corps. They married just after the First World War began. Archie was then sent off to France; Agatha worked in the dispensary of a makeshift hospital in Torquay. After the war, the couple settled in a London suburb. They had one child, Rosalind. Archie went to work in the City; Agatha began writing novels. It eventually dawned on her that there was something a little wrong with Archie: he was unapologetically self-serving. She quotes him saying, “I hate it when people are ill or unhappy—it sort of spoils everything for me.” As Agatha, in her thirties, lost her youthful looks and became increasingly successful as a writer, he spent more and more time on the golf course.

In 1926, Clara died, plunging her daughter into the kind of sorrow that Archie found so obstructive to his happiness. Agatha moved into her mother’s house, to ready it for sale. Archie visited occasionally. One day, he arrived and told her that he had fallen in love with a woman they knew—Nancy Neele, a good golfer—and that he wanted a divorce. Thereafter, he lived mostly at his club, seeing Neele on weekends. For months, when he was home, Agatha tried to persuade him to change his mind. Then, one night, she got in her car and drove away. It took the police ten days to find her.

What happened, insofar as it could be pieced together later, is that she abandoned her car near a small town in Surrey, about an hour’s drive from home, then took a train to Waterloo Station, in London. There she saw a poster advertising the Hydropathic Hotel, in Harrogate, a spa town in Yorkshire. That night, she travelled to Harrogate, where she checked into the hotel under the name of Theresa Neele. She spent her days reading and shopping and taking walks.

Meanwhile, a manhunt had been launched. The Surrey constabulary, enlarged to five hundred men, combed the downs and dragged the ponds in the area around her abandoned car. When the weekend came, they were joined by a mob of volunteers, plus bloodhounds. Ice-cream venders set up stands to serve the crowd. Most of the major newspapers carried a daily story on the matter. Christie’s fellow-guests at the hotel looked at the photos of her in the papers, but none of them made the connection. Indeed, she later recalled playing bridge with them and discussing the strange case of the missing novelist.

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Eventually, a reward of a hundred pounds was offered. Christie liked to go to the hotel’s Palm Court after dinner and listen to the band. After a while, the drummer and the saxophonist recognized her, and they went to the police. The police called Archie; he arrived and stationed himself in the hotel lobby. When Christie came downstairs, he identified her.

A number of theories have been advanced to explain this episode. One is that the disappearance was Agatha’s bid to regain Archie’s affections. According to another scenario, her flight was a way of boosting sales. Finally, it was hypothesized that she had experienced fugue, a form of amnesia in which a person travels to another place and may assume another identity. This last was the explanation that Christie and her family settled on. She claimed to have no recollection of what had happened, and her autobiography says not one word about the incident. If it was a ploy to get Archie back, it failed. (He persuaded Agatha to give him a divorce. He soon married Neele, and they are said to have been happy for the rest of their lives.) But if Agatha’s flight was an effort to get the attention of the public, it was successful. She had produced six detective novels by that time, the last of which, “The Murder of Roger Ackroyd” (1926), was extremely popular. That success, in part, was why her disappearance received so much attention. Conversely, her disappearance, with its interesting link to detective fiction, made her a celebrity. Her earlier novels were reprinted, and they sold out.

For people of Christie’s time and class, writing was not an uncommon pastime. Her sister, Madge, had a play produced in the West End long before she did. But why detective stories? Again, this was not a remarkable choice. The period between the First and Second World Wars has been called the golden age of the detective story. Practically everyone who wanted to write had a go at it. Such books were adored by ordinary readers—according to Colin Watson, a historian of the genre, housewives brought them home in the shopping basket—but they were just as popular with educated people. W. H. Auden said that when he picked up a detective story he couldn’t put it down until he had finished it. In T. S. Eliot’s “The Family Reunion,” the mystery is solved by a character named Agatha. The intellectuals didn’t just read detective stories, they wrote them: G. K. Chesterton; C. Day-Lewis; Ronald Knox, the Roman Catholic chaplain of Oxford; S. S. Van Dine, a distinguished Nietzsche scholar. Because the form was so popular, almost any detective novel stood a good chance of getting a contract. That fact was no doubt in Christie’s mind as she went to her desk—Archie’s salary was small. At the start, she was a clumsy writer. But she was able to offer her readers what they wanted, a whodunnit, also called a “puzzle mystery”—a story that is a contest between the author and the reader as to whether the reader can guess who the culprit is before the end of the book.

“It’s not cheating if everybody does it.”

Though Christie’s novels sometimes have colorful settings—a Nile steamer, an archaeological dig in Mesopotamia—most of them are set in England. The corpse may be discovered in its time-honored location, the library, or it may be stuffed into the cupboard under the stairs, with the tennis racquets. As for the weapon, golden-age mystery writers exercised great ingenuity over this. In the words of Christie’s colleague Dorothy Sayers, victims were brought down by “licking poisoned stamps; shaving-brushes inoculated with dread disease . . . poisoned mattresses; knives dropped through the ceiling; stabbing with a sharp icicle; electrocution by telephone.” Christie was less fanciful. Now and then, the victim is shot or stabbed, and poor Agnes, the one stored with the tennis racquets, has a skewer driven through her brain, but Christie favored a clean conking on the head or—her overwhelming preference—poison. That choice was surely a product of her war work in the dispensary, with its many shelves of potentially lethal drugs. But poison probably appealed to her also because it did not involve assault. Christie disliked violence. When, in her novels, someone starts to look dangerous, her detective does not pull a gun. He doesn’t have a gun. Bystanders may wrestle the malefactor to the ground. In one case, where there are no bystanders, the detective squirts soapy water into the murderer’s face. It works.

The murder that sets the plot in motion is rarely shocking. For one thing, we almost never see it happen. Furthermore, the victim is ordinarily someone with whom we do not sympathize, even when we feel we should. Christie did not mind bumping off a child or two. One is driven off a cliff; one is drowned while bobbing for apples. In “Murder Is Easy” (1939), little Tommy Pierce, the town sociopath—he tortures animals—is among the victims. “I shall never forget Tommy’s face when I pushed him off the window sill that day,” the sweet old homicidal maniac who dispatched him says. Much more often, however, the victim is a rich, nasty old person who enjoys taunting his prospective heirs with the accusation that they wish him dead, so that they can collect their inheritances. He’s usually right. Rather boringly, the most common motive for homicide in Christie is money.

This rule—that Christie’s murders do not touch the heart—admits of one curious exception: the murder that the culprit commits, after the main murder, in order to get rid of someone who knows too much. Here the victim is often a nice or in any case blameless person, and we do witness the crime, or at least its prelude. In “A Murder Is Announced” (1950), Miss Murgatroyd, who knows that Letty Blacklock wasn’t in the dining room when the gun went off, is taking the washing off the line when she hears someone approaching. She turns, and smiles in welcome, obviously to a neighbor. It has started to rain. “Here’s your scarf,” the visitor says. “Shall I put it round your neck?” One shivers.

Christie created two famous detectives: Hercule Poirot and Jane Marple. Poirot, formerly a member of the Belgian police force, is retired, but he is willing, occasionally, to interest himself in a case. Poirot’s most obvious characteristic is his dandyism. He dyes his hair; he smokes thin, black Russian cigarettes, often regarded with alarm by those to whom he offers them; he wears pointy patent-leather shoes ill-suited to walking the grounds of the country houses where he must often do his sleuthing. He deplores the English preference for fresh air, thin women, and tea. Poirot says that, in interrogations, he always exaggerates his foreignness. The person being questioned then takes him less seriously, and in consequence tells him more. His Franglais is a treat. “I speak the English very well,” he says proudly.

Miss Marple is the opposite of Poirot. She comes from a sleepy village, St. Mary Mead, and she seems a “sweetly bewildered old lady.” She has china-blue eyes; she knits constantly; nobody thinks anything of her. They should, because she is a steely-minded detective. When she is on a case, she says, she makes it a rule to believe the worst of everyone—in her words, she has a mind “like a sink”—and she reports with regret that experience has confirmed her in this point of view.

Miss Marple presents the inconvenience that, since she is not a professional detective, she cannot interrogate. But, by seeming a dotty old lady, she—like Poirot, with his pointy shoes—tends to be discounted and therefore can get people to say more than they should. Her method is to murmur platitudes. In “A Caribbean Mystery” (1964), we find her at a beach resort, with nothing to do, no homicide in sight. Then she gets the news that Major Palgrave, the old man who has been boring her with recollections of his service in Kenya, died in the night. She goes into action. Here she is, having a little chat with Miss Prescott about Mr. Dyson, a fellow-guest whom she doesn’t like the look of. Miss Prescott speaks:

“It seems there was some scandal when his first wife was still alive! Apparently this woman, Lucky—such a name!—who I think was a cousin of his first wife, came out here and joined them. . . . And people talked a lot because they got on so well together—if you know what I mean.”

“People do notice things so much, don’t they?” said Miss Marple.

“And then of course, when his wife died rather suddenly—”

“She died here, on this island?”

“No. No, I think they were in Martinique or Tobago at the time.”

“I see.”

“But I gathered from some other people who were there at the time, and who came on here and talked about things, that the doctor wasn’t very satisfied.”

“Indeed,” said Miss Marple with interest.

“It was only gossip, of course, but—well, Mr. Dyson certainly married again very quickly.” She lowered her voice again. “Only a month, I believe.”

“Only a month,” said Miss Marple.

AChristie story goes more or less as follows. By means of interrogation—or, in Miss Marple’s case, snooping (she does not eschew field glasses)—the investigator determines two things for each suspect. First, did he have a motive? Was he, for example, the victim’s son, and deeply in debt? The second question is whether the person had an opportunity to commit the crime. Where was the impecunious son at the time of the murder?

The answers are rarely definitive. Sometimes, people with motives nevertheless have firm alibis. Conversely, innocent-seeming people may have utterly flimsy alibis. In “Hercule Poirot’s Christmas” (1938), when a young man says that he was in the ballroom, by himself, playing records, while the family patriarch was upstairs having his throat cut, Poirot takes this as an indicator of innocence rather than of guilt. It is, he says, “the alibi of a man who did not know that he would be called upon for such a thing.” Eventually, this man does come under suspicion, but soon the finger points to someone else instead. This mystification game is a standard device of suspense literature, but nobody did it quite like Christie.

She tries to help the reader, or she pretends to. Often, the detective has a confidant, to whom, as with Holmes and Watson, he or she will summarize the findings so far. Detectives who have no one to tell things to will often make a list (which Christie prints) of the evidence for and against each suspect. By such devices, Christie keeps the readers thinking that they will be able to solve the mystery.

Then she begins confusing them further. A classic trick is the red herring. When Violet faints at the mention of Jim’s name, or when Pilar throws her passport out the window, experienced readers know that they should ignore this. It is too showy. But when Poirot notices that, since Roger Ackroyd’s death, a chair has been moved in his study—that is, when the occurrence is trivial but nonetheless mentioned—this is potentially a real clue. Or it may be a red herring, masquerading, by its modesty, as a real clue.

A related subterfuge is the “double bluff.” Here, Christie gives us, near the beginning of the book, an obvious culprit. In “Murder at the Vicarage” (1930), the town vicar arrives home one evening and sees Lawrence Redding, a local painter, running out of the vicarage looking pale and shaken. The vicar then enters his house, goes to his study, and finds the town’s widely hated magistrate, Colonel Protheroe, slumped over the desk, with a bullet in his head. Christie seems to be telling us that Redding is the culprit. But we know her by now, so we say to ourselves that Redding is too obvious—and too obvious too early in the book—and so we cross him off our list. Soon, it seems, we are justified. Redding goes to the police and confesses to the crime. Then Anne Protheroe, the colonel’s wife, confesses, saying that Redding, her lover, was only trying to shield her. But then the suspicion shifts again, and again—until it comes full circle. The murderers, it turns out, were indeed Redding and Anne. Of course, the double bluff may be a triple bluff. In guessing that Christie is fooling us, we can be fooled, as with the red herring.

But, in truth, the guessing that we are asked to do is almost fruitless, because the solution to the mystery typically involves a fantastic amount of background material that we’re not privy to until the end of the book, when the detective shares it with us. Christie’s novels crawl with impostors. Letty is not really Letty; she’s Lotty, the sister of Letty. And Hattie isn’t Hattie. She’s a piece of trash from Trieste, who, with her husband, Sir George, killed Hattie (who was also married to him) and assumed her identity. The investigator digs up this material but doesn’t tell anyone till the end.

In response to protests that the resulting dénouements were unguessable, and therefore “unfair,” Christie replied that the reader should have been able to figure them out. The culprit, she said, was always the most obvious person; he just didn’t seem so. That is a brazen falsehood. In most of Christie’s books, the killer turns out to be a most unlikely person. In one, he is a dead man; in another, a child. In yet another, amazingly, it is Poirot. In one virtuoso performance, all twelve suspects, together, committed the crime. This is not to speak of a more common problem: killers who are likable people, and whom, therefore, we don’t suspect. I read all sixty-six of Christie’s detective novels, and I guessed two of the culprits. I’ll bet that this is a fairly typical record.

How did Christie come up with these ingenious plots? In John Curran’s recently published “Agatha Christie’s Secret Notebooks,” the notebooks in question are school exercise books in which Christie worked out her plots. In many, some pages had already been used. In one, her daughter had done her penmanship practice; in another, the family had recorded their bridge scores. But Christie was a thrifty woman, and she used the remaining blank pages to work out her plots. She made lists of possible victims, culprits, and M.O.s. Then she picked the combinations that pleased her. Curran thinks that this shows the fertility of her imagination; I think it shows her willingness to work by formula, and thereby to forgo depth in favor of the puzzle. If she had given her characters any psychological definition, we could have solved the mystery. But as long as they are kept suspended, opaque—as they must be, in order for the book to be a puzzle—any one of them could be the culprit.

This practice exposed her to the contempt of some critics. Edmund Wilson wrote of detective stories, “I finally got to feel that I had to unpack large crates by swallowing the excelsior in order to find at the bottom a few bent and rusty nails.” The same point is actually made by Christie, via Mrs. Ariadne Oliver, a recurrent character who is a detective-story writer. “When it all comes out,” Mrs. Oliver says, the killer “seems, somehow, so inadequate. A kind of anticlimax.” If a character isn’t interesting, who cares if he killed Colonel Protheroe?

“We fight, we flee. We fight, we flee….”

What we get instead is not just a puzzle but a comedy. When characters are informed of a murder, they tend to say things like “Very unpleasant” or “Most distressing for you, Elspeth.” That may sound like standard post-Wildean wit, but Christie can work it up into lovely scenes. In “4:50 from Paddington” (1957), a decomposing corpse has been found in the barn of a great estate. The family’s grandson, Alexander, is home from school on vacation, with a friend. The two boys, thrilled by the news, come tearing up to the barn on their bicycles in the hope of seeing the body. The policeman at the door says no. Alexander pleads:

“Oh sir, please, sir. You never know. We might know who she was. Oh please, sir, do be a sport. It’s not fair. Here’s a murder, right in our own barn. It’s the sort of chance that might never happen again. Do be a sport, sir.” . . .

“Take ’em in, Sanders,” said Inspector Bacon to the constable who was standing by the barn door. “One’s only young once!”

The murderers, too, are funny. One of them worries that he may botch the job of eliminating his chosen victim, so he kills someone else first—the town rector!—to practice.

Ayear after Christie’s divorce from Archie, she went on a trip to the Middle East and visited the famous dig at Ur, in Iraq. There she met an archeologist, Max Mallowan, whom, soon afterward, she married. She was thirty-nine. Mallowan was fourteen years younger, but he saw no impediment. He was an intelligent and easygoing man, and it was an affectionate marriage. For years, Christie went with him on digs in Iraq and Syria, countries that she came to love. At most of these outposts, a writing room was erected for her. She was also given responsible jobs to do, removing dirt from the relics (she used facial cleanser) and photographing them. At night, the whole team dressed for dinner, and the cooks produced nice things, like walnut soufflés.

Max and Agatha made this yearly migration until 1960. In his later years, Max held a chair at the University of London; then he was elected a fellow at All Souls, Oxford. Christie, of course, grew old sooner than he. In her memoir she depicts herself as “thirteen stone”—a hundred and eighty-two pounds—“of solid flesh and what could only be described as ‘a kind face.’ ”

Some people say that Christie’s shining period was her middle years. I find that she wrote her best books, in alternation with her worst books, until near the end. She was not a great writer, and some of her admirers, including Janet Morgan—in the authorized biography—say that she wasn’t even a particularly good writer. I disagree. She could produce a bad book, and when she did she usually knew it. Halfway through “Death Comes as the End” (1944), she wrote to Max that she was “despondent about it.” (This is indeed her worst detective novel.) But, from the beginning, she was perfectly fitted to her genre. Not only were her plots tight but she wrote excellent, natural dialogue. As the years passed, she developed a good feel for detail. In one book, the Bishop of Westchester, meeting Miss Marple in a hotel lobby, has a sudden memory of his childhood, in a Hampshire vicarage. He remembers himself calling out, “Be a crocodile now, Aunty Janie. Be a crocodile and eat me.” The vision flashes, then vanishes.

When Christie was in her mid-forties, however, she began to weary of writing. For a long time, she had been averaging at least one novel a year. She felt like a “sausage machine,” she said. She now described Poirot as an “ego-centric creep.” Like Conan Doyle with Sherlock Holmes, she tried to eliminate him, but the fans, and hence the publishers, protested. She also lost her taste for sin, perhaps because of the Second World War, next to which her little murders may have seemed to her frivolous. Wickedness, she says in a novel of 1961, has “no black and evil splendour.”

As she lost interest in fiction, she turned to drama—and then to film and television—for which she adapted her novels and stories. But much of the time, in her late years, she didn’t want to do any writing at all. She drafted her books, Janet Morgan writes, “in interludes between other occupations—gardening, cooking, outings, helping Max—and she would willingly abandon a chapter for a walk.” You can tell. The characters get thinner; the pacing slackens; some of the plots are preposterous. (In one, a house labors under a Gypsy curse.) Eventually, delirium set in. She died in 1976, at eighty-five.

In her last years, ironically, she became more and more popular. Her books, even in hardcover, sold between forty and fifty thousand copies in their first few weeks of publication. She received the C.B.E. in 1971. The Nicaraguan government put Poirot’s face on a postage stamp.

For today’s readers, one pleasure of Christie’s books is her portrait of the times: the period between the two world wars and, above all, the changes that took place after the second war. Her people are upper middle class or, sometimes, upper class. They gaze with astonished disgust at housing developments and supermarkets. They complain bitterly about how heavily they are taxed and how they can no longer afford to maintain the grand houses they saw as their birthright. Eventually, they sell these huge piles to the nouveaux riches. (Christie’s own home in Devon, a lovely Georgian house on the River Dart, was turned over to the National Trust in 2000.) In a wonderful scene, a visitor to the apartment of an old major sees large rectangles of high polish on the parquet. That is where the Oriental rugs were that the major has just been forced to sell.

Social inequality seems to have meant nothing to Christie, or to most other golden-age detective novelists. Julian Symons, in his “Bloody Murder,” an erudite and witty history of the detective story, sums it up: “The social order in these stories was as fixed . . . as that of the Incas.” On the other hand, if we consider Christie within the context of her time and social class, she was a proto-feminist. Miss Marple is far from the only plucky female investigator in her novels. And though Poirot is allowed to make condescending remarks about women (“Women are never kind”), such comments, like his pointy shoes, are part of her satire of his silly, Frenchy ways. Furthermore, his aspersions are as specks compared with Christie’s portrayal of the difficulty of being a woman. “I always had brains, even as a girl,” one of her old ladies says. “But they wouldn’t let me do anything.” (She is the one who pushed Tommy Pierce out of the window.) Another woman, accused of being a gold-digger, answers, “The world is very cruel to women. They must do what they can for themselves—while they are young. When they are old and ugly no one will help them.”

Racism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia turn up constantly in Christie’s books. In one, a hostess serves a special dessert called Nigger in His Shirt (chocolate pudding covered with whipped cream). We also get dagos, wogs, and Eye-ties. Most frequently commented on, however, are the Jews. In an early novel, “The Secret of Chimneys” (1925), Herman Isaacstein, who is, of course, a financier with a big nose, is invited to a political meeting at a country estate. When the host, Lord Caterham, is told who Isaacstein is, he says, “Curious names these people have.” Caterham starts calling him Nosystein. The others take this up and shorten it to Nosy.

The treatment, then, is intended as comic. It is part of Christie’s satire, from book to book, of her countrymen: their obsession with their gardens and their dogs; their stiff upper lips; their cucumber sandwiches; their inimitable village names (Much Deeping, Chipping Somerton). After the Second World War, some readers, especially Americans, were not amused by her characters’ views on ethnic difference. Christie’s publishers received letters, including one from the Anti-Defamation League. Her agent probably figured that such letters would seem ridiculous to her. In any case, he didn’t forward them to her. He simply gave Dodd, Mead, her American publishers, permission to delete any potentially offensive references to Jews or Catholics. She apparently didn’t notice the changes.

Some people have come up with subtle explanations for Christie’s popularity and for the general enthusiasm for the detective novel in her time. Auden thought that the fundamental appeal was religious. At least in Protestant countries, he wrote, the solution of the crime vicariously relieves our guilt, restores us to innocence. Others have said that the solace is political. The interwar years were marked by terrible political upheaval. The detective story may have reassured people that disruptive forces lay not in the social order but just in one bad person, who could be removed. According to John Cawelti, in “Adventure, Mystery, and Romance,” a probing history of the detective story, the genre is still doing that duty. Another proposal is that the loss and the recovery are literary—that readers of the twenties onward, assaulted by modernism, were grateful to find in detective literature sentences with subjects and predicates, and stories with a beginning, a middle, and an end. Borges said that after you read a detective novel other fictions seem to you shapeless. At bottom, all these arguments are the same: the appeal of the detective story is the restoration of order.

Miss Marple doesn’t quite agree. Or, in her view, order is restored only till the next time. She says that since the Second World War you don’t know who your neighbors are, but she doesn’t really believe that there’s a cause of modern unease. “You could blame the war (both the wars),” she thinks, “or the younger generation, or women going out to work, or the atom bomb, or just the Government—but what one really meant was the simple fact that one was growing old.” As for crime, she seems to think that it’s been around forever, and that small, stable communities offer no protection. “One does see so much evil in a village,” she says. She enjoys describing the poisonings, clubbings, rapes, stickups, and so on that have occurred in St. Mary Mead. This is comical, and the comedy is there, as the theorists have claimed, to tame evil. But always, in Christie, there is a melancholy note, a skepticism. In “The Body in the Library” (1942), the body belongs to Ruby, a dance instructor in a hotel. She has been strangled with the satin waistband of her party dress. “She may, of course, have had some remarkable qualities,” a police commissioner says of the girl. “Probably not,” Miss Marple answers. ♦

Murder By Poison

Illustration of Marie Lafarge
A notorious arsenic case, of 1840, involved an aristocrat named Marie Lafarge.Illustration by Pierre Mornet

In early-nineteenth-century England, a good way to get rid of your husband was arsenic. A medical examiner usually couldn’t tell whether the poison was involved, because the symptoms—diarrhea, vomiting, abdominal pain—are much like those of other disorders. Nor could he necessarily place you at the murder scene. The dying typically took hours. Also, you could administer the poison gradually, a little bit every day. In the mid-century, arsenic poisoning was commonly the resort of women. (In 1851, the House of Lords tried to pass a law forbidding women to buy arsenic.) But unpleasant husbands were not the only people you might want to eliminate. During this period of feverish social mobility, a young person might be waiting impatiently for an inheritance, and there was Uncle Ted, sitting on all that money and meanwhile bossing you around, toying with your hopes. In such cases, male poisoners presumably outnumbered females.

These problems and their contribution to the role of medicine in the law are the subject of Sandra Hempel’s new book, “The Inheritor’s Powder: A Tale of Arsenic, Murder, and the New Forensic Science” (Norton). Hempel, an English medical journalist, hangs her discussion on a specific case. One November morning in 1833, George Bodle, seventy-nine years old and the owner of a prosperous farm near the Kentish village of Plumstead, came down to his kitchen for breakfast. The maid prepared the coffee. George drank a half-pint bowl, and a small cup was taken to his wife, upstairs. Then the grounds were reboiled, and three women of the household—two relatives and a maid—got to have some diluted coffee. After that, the charwoman came to the back door, collected the grounds, as she did every morning, and took them to her daughter, Mary, to boil for a third time, so that Mary’s seven children could have a hot drink. (They didn’t have coffee that morning; the eldest daughter thought the brew looked peculiar.) Within minutes, everyone in the Bodle household who had drunk the coffee fell violently ill. Soon afterward, they began to recover, except for George. He died three days later.

From the moment the doctor first examined George, he suspected poisoning. This raised some questions, however. Was the poisoner trying to kill George alone? If so, why did he poison four other people? The motive was more easily guessed at. George was an uningratiating man. His son, known to everyone as Middle John, worked for him as an ordinary laborer, and was treated by him as such. Middle John’s son Young John had also worked in his grandfather’s fields until George fired him. Unbeknownst to the Johns, Samuel Baxter, George’s son-in-law, had just witnessed a new will for George that was very much in Baxter’s favor. Who wouldn’t have wanted to get rid of the old man?

Through much of the nineteenth century, a third of all criminal cases of poisoning involved arsenic. One reason for its popularity was simply its availability. All you had to do was go into a chemist’s shop and say that you needed to kill rats. A child could practically obtain arsenic. The going price for half an ounce was tuppence.

Hempel points to another probable cause, an interesting one: the press. In 1836, right before the poisoning craze peaked, the government decreased the tax on newspapers from fourpence to a penny. This development coincided with another important change: a rapid rise in literacy among the working class. Working-class people liked murder stories. (So, no doubt, did readers of higher rank.) Consequently, the number of newspapers shot up, as did the sales of any paper willing to report vividly and at length on poisoning cases. Hempel writes, “In 1856, when the Illustrated Times published a special edition on the trial of the ‘Rugeley poisoner,’ Dr. William Palmer—whose victims were said to include his wife and several of his children as well as a gambling friend, John Parsons Cook—circulation was said to have doubled to 400,000.” The articles probably inspired a few poisonings. Indeed, they more or less provided instructions. To make things more exciting, the papers issued sinister warnings. “If your hands tingle, do you not fancy it is arsenic?,” a writer in the Leader asked. “Your friends and relations all smile kindly upon you: the meal . . . looks correct, but how can you possibly tell there is not arsenic in the curry?” People accustomed to believe that poisoning was something done by foreigners now saw it at their own front door, and, in some cases, as a product of their own social ills. A trial that riveted the public in 1849 was that of Rebecca Smith, aged forty-three, married to an alcoholic and “suffering great deprivations.” In eighteen years of marriage, she had given birth to eleven children, most of whom, she confessed, she had put to death with arsenic, rubbing it onto her nipples before she nursed them. Her explanation was that she was afraid they “might come to want.” She wouldn’t mind being executed, she said, if it weren’t for her worry that her husband would neglect her one surviving child: her first, a girl, whom, apparently, she couldn’t bear to kill. Rebecca was hanged.

Arsenic is a chemical element that occurs naturally in the earth, and in its raw state it is not harmful. Because it can produce a brilliant green pigment, nineteenth-century manufacturers used it in wallpaper, paints, fabrics, and many other items. It becomes poisonous only when it is converted into arsenic trioxide, popularly known as “white arsenic.” Even white arsenic, however, is benign in low doses. Doctors prescribed it for asthma, typhus, malaria, worms, menstrual cramps, and other disorders. In high doses, though, it causes not just death but a horrible death. Madame Bovary killed herself with arsenic, and Flaubert described the process in detail: the retching, the convulsions, the brown blotches breaking out on the body, the hands plucking at the bedsheets. He is said to have vomited at the dinner table two nights in a row after writing this scene.

Until the twentieth century, doctors had no idea how to treat arsenic poisoning. They tried just about everything. Mostly, they fed patients milk, vinegar, linseed, sugar water, egg whites—you name it—in order to induce vomiting. They also used that old standby: bleeding, whether by incision or, more often, with leeches. A famous doctor of the period recommended putting twelve to fifteen leeches on the belly at the place where the patient said the pain was worst. If the pain moved to a new spot, the leeches should be pried off and repositioned accordingly.

Beyond treatment, there was another, more fundamental mystery: doctors usually didn’t know whether the condition they were dealing with was arsenic poisoning. The tests for the presence of arsenic sound almost comical. A favorite was to throw a sample of the victim’s stomach contents into the fireplace. If, as it burned, it smelled like garlic, the corpse was thought to contain arsenic. But that was assuming that the doctor had a sample of the stomach contents. In the early decades of the nineteenth century, Hempel writes, most medical men “would have regarded tasks such as scraping flakes of dry vomit from a sickroom floor as being beyond their professional remit.” They began collecting such evidence. Soon some diagnosticians acquired better material. At the beginning of the century, postmortems were rare. It was considered irreligious to interfere with a dead body. (For corpses to dissect, medical schools often depended on grave robbers.) Now autopsies became more common; doctors could get samples of the victim’s stomach contents. But they still lacked dependable methods for analyzing them. Often, they just resorted to the garlic-smell test.

“I don’t really know how to tell you this, sweetheart, so I’m just going to come right out and say it: Your goldfish ran away.”

The first person to come up with a reliable chemical test for arsenic poisoning was an obscure but determined chemist named James Marsh. His procedure, as Hempel explains it, involved feeding sulfuric acid and zinc through an apparatus that combined tubes, rods, stopcocks, nozzles, and a great deal more. Marsh presented his invention in 1836, and won a big prize for it. (With modifications, it was used for a hundred and fifty years.) Arsenic was now traceable in the body. For that reason—and because the enactment of divorce laws made domestic homicide less tempting—arsenic poisoning fell into disuse.

George Bodle was a rich man, worth two million pounds—more than three million dollars—today. Still, the coffee grounds had to be boiled three times. (And, until the beans were ground, they were kept locked up.) Hempel is good on the pinched quality of the Bodles’ lives and their lack of feeling for one another. After George’s death, fittingly, no one in the family was willing to pay for an investigation of the circumstances. Apparently, they weren’t curious.

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A Damn Fine Cup of Coffee

With the severity in Hempel’s portrait comes a large measure of sheer disgustingness. When officials in France exhumed a body for arsenic analysis, they “gave up on their lifting equipment and sent instead for a large spoon.” In an 1847 trial involving the alleged murder of two little boys, the toxicologist showed the jury two stomachs, one that looked normal and another in “a soft, pulpy, cheese-like condition.” Nor do we reach the end of this book without knowing the color and the consistency of an arsenic victim’s feces.

Melodrama also plays a large role in “The Inheritor’s Powder.” Hempel is fond of foreshadowing, but cliffhangers are her special joy. Just as the freshly poisoned Bodles are staggering around the house, she switches gears and begins a discussion of the history of toxicology. Only about forty pages later do we find out that George died and the others survived. Why the digression? Because, I think, Hempel was worried that her book would be unexciting, or too short.

It must be said that some of her digressions are more interesting than her main story. This is true, for example, of the 1840 case of Marie Lafarge, which seems to have been the most popular arsenic-poisoning story in nineteenth-century Europe. The defendant was a twenty-four-year-old Frenchwoman, an aristocrat and an orphan, who had been forced by her relatives into marriage with a certain Charles Lafarge. Lafarge had presented himself as a wealthy manufacturer and the owner of a château, but it turned out that he was bankrupt and the château was infested with rats and a frightening mother-in-law. Furthermore, according to a contemporary account in the Times, Lafarge’s attentions to Marie “were paid in a manner that shocked her refinement.” A few months into the marriage, Charles began having spells of vomiting and diarrhea. (This seems to have been a case of gradual poisoning.) In time, he died, whereupon his family cried foul. At the resulting trial, the raven-haired Marie at first excited great sympathy. Her lawyer, Hempel says, made sure that the jury knew of “the excellence of her piano-playing, her delightful voice, her competence in more than one science, her reading and translation of Goethe, her fluency in several languages and composing of Italian verse.” She also had a flair for drama. When it was reported in court that a group of doctors had found no evidence of arsenic in the corpse, Marie responded, Hempel writes, by “clasping her hands, raising her eyes to heaven, and then fainting and having to be carried out of the court, while her lawyer sat weeping.” Other experts, however, believed that arsenic was present. About a year into the trial, the renowned toxicologist Mathieu Orfila was called upon to examine Lafarge’s remains. A “suitably dramatic storm burst over the town and in a darkened courtroom, lit fitfully by lightning,” Orfila announced that, according to the Marsh test, the body contained arsenic. By then, Marie’s hair was streaked with gray and she had to be carried in and out of courtroom on a sofa. She was found guilty and sentenced to hard labor for life.

Compared with Marie, the Bodles, in Hempel’s telling, are a dull bunch, and after a while, partly because of the digressions, you stop trying to figure out who killed George. So why didn’t Hempel choose a sexier case, like Marie’s? I think the reason is that, whatever her taste for fitful lightning, she was trying to write a serious book. The Lafarges were just too camp. Besides, they were not English, and Hempel’s book is about nineteenth-century England. Finally, l’affaire Lafarge, together with most other poisoning cases of the period, may have been inadequately documented outside the sensationalist press. Hempel is careful to use respectable sources. The Bodles appear in parish records, tax registers, trial transcripts, and the like, and, as Hempel’s endnotes show, she relied heavily on such material. That may be why the Bodles are boring.

In dealing with the arsenic fad, Hempel is writing about public health, and the appropriate story to compare with her arsenic book is not another tale of murder but another tale of public health—for example, her preceding (and first) book, “The Strange Case of the Broad Street Pump: John Snow and the Mystery of Cholera” (2007). Here, as is not the case with “The Inheritor’s Powder,” the medical threat was an emergency. There were four major cholera outbreaks in England between 1831 and 1866, causing many thousands of deaths. Furthermore, cholera is more interesting sociologically. Because it has to do with sanitation, it is more common among the poor, and what you learn from this book about the life of poor people in mid-nineteenth-century London—the orphanages filled with children vomiting on the sheets, whole families living in rooms eight feet by ten feet, the drinking water “a cloudy brew of slime, industrial effluent, and the recycled waste of people’s bowels”—you will not soon forget.

Almost every respected medical professional in England at that time was certain that cholera was due to miasma: air polluted by emanations from dung, rotting flesh, etc. The person who exploded this theory was a doctor named John Snow. By tracing a specific outbreak, in Soho, Snow proved that the disease was due not to polluted air but to polluted drinking water—a matter much more solvable than the rather mystic miasma. Reforms were instituted, and by the end of the century cholera was more or less gone from England.

Detecting arsenic poisoning, however useful, is a small matter compared with eliminating cholera. Also, “The Strange Case of the Broad Street Pump” has depth and poignance, especially in its portrait of Dr. Snow. He was a quiet-living man—a bachelor, a vegetarian—from a poor family, and he was generally disregarded by London’s medical élite. He died of a stroke at forty-five, without ever guessing that he would later be known by many as the father of epidemiology. By contrast, much of what Hempel tells us about James Marsh has to do with his widow’s efforts to obtain an adequate pension.

You can say this, though: “The Inheritor’s Powder” is a nice, nasty murder story, and thus part of an honored English tradition. Many nations contributed to the genre of the murder mystery, but it is rightly considered an English specialty. Hempel may have had Agatha Christie, the author of sixty-six detective novels, in the back of her mind when she chose to describe the Bodle poisonings. Christie’s preferred method of homicide was poison, and arsenic was one of her favorites. In any case, George Orwell most certainly had been thinking of Christie’s murderers, with their understandable motivations (love or money), when, in 1946, he wrote his essay “The Decline of the English Murder,” deploring what he saw as the new, casual style of murder: drivers killing hitchhikers whom they had picked up and not thinking much about it afterward.

The Bodle case is recognizably pre-decline. I won’t tell you who the culprit was, but the motive was time-honored—money—and the trial was an enjoyably disgraceful spectacle, with accusations of theft and fornication, and worse, flying back and forth. Unlike the cool-tempered crimes that Orwell complained about, this story still delivers the old shock: that someone actually plotted and accomplished the death of another human being. Even if we forget about the moral problem, what about the risk? Plus, George Bodle’s murderer poisoned five people in order to kill only one, and succeeded. That’s something. ♦

Is Selling Shares in Yourself the Way of the Future?

Two tech-minded brothers are testing the market on themselves.
Portrait of Daniil and David Liberman mixed together between blocks of space.
Illustration by Bryce Wymer
Daniil and David Liberman think that venture capital could reduce inequality. They’re selling shares in themselves.

Imagine you are growing up in Moscow, part of a family of eight living in a small apartment. The Berlin Wall fell not too long ago. Four times a year, you join your siblings in unpacking large boxes of buckwheat that your mother has kept stacked against a wall. You spread the kernels, pluck out the weevils, bake it all at a sterilizing temperature, and pack it up again. You are preparing for the future.

Around you, there is piracy and chaos. But you’re enterprising, and keep to your path. At university, you hardly sleep, and you eat what you can afford. Why do you work yourself this way? It’s not as if you’re getting paid for it.

Another version of yourself, in another time, though, is. Now, living in the California sun with some success, you reflect on your poor, wan, sleepless younger self and feel a wave of gratitude, and then of prickly regret. The kid you were had different dreams; it strikes you as unfair that you sit pretty on the spoils of that person’s efforts. If you could take some of your wealth and send it backward in time, to your younger self, you would.

We usually think of inequalities as extending from bottom to top: I earn a little wealth over eight hours; Bill Gates earns much more. But there are also inequalities that extend longitudinally, from the past into the future. Your young self does labor for which your older self collects rewards. Such timing issues—how much money you receive or can spend now and later—have effects on your financial fate. In a more equal world, you cannot help but think, people would draw on their lifetime wealth throughout their lives, not merely at the pinnacle of their careers. You notice that older generations and big corporations rule the roost in the United States, but it’s not clear why this should be so.

At your day job, which deals in shareholder capital, you impress your graying superiors, while at night you talk with young friends who, beset by debt and meagre wages, feel they’re barely eking out a life. You dream of what would happen if the money from your day job could cross over to your friends at night. Imagine that this idea becomes a fixation, so much that you decide you’d risk a piece of your own future on a solution. And now imagine that, instead of being one person, you are two.

Daniil and David Liberman, two entrepreneur brothers who purport to share a single life, met me one chilly November afternoon in midtown, and we set off for a walk through Central Park. The brothers have a sandy shade of hair and a punctilious Eastern European way of furrowing their brows and making little tutting noises as they zero in on the mot juste. They were fresh from Playa Vista, California, a residential and office-space hamlet whose chief virtue is its proximity to LAX. Daniil, who is older, at thirty-nine, has a gaunt, freckled face, and when we met was wearing his hair in the long, curling style of George Frideric Handel. David, a year younger, resembles Stephen Hawking in his youth. For some days, they’d been courted by fancy investors, with a schedule that included a trip in a private helicopter, an experience they found fun but, like most things that aren’t part of what they call their “mission,” distracting. “We need to get back home so we can really work,” Daniil, who was wearing green trousers with Pokémon and flowers on the legs, told me. The brothers’ mission, they think, is chasing the future, so in one way or another they are usually playing catch-up.

Few members of the general public have heard of the Libermans or their work, which has a looping, manic trajectory, like an ant’s climb up a candy cane. Yet they belong to a rising techie class that quietly traffics novel-seeming ideas among powerful people, shaping the wider world we live in along the way. In the past decade, the brothers led the design of the 3-D-Bitmoji feature on Snapchat, helped put out a hit Russian political-satire show, and devised an approach to capping corporate returns for investors. They have a way of popping up, like a lanky, pale Bill and Ted, in the background of interesting moments, with improbable associates. One friend of theirs calls them “hilariously networked.” Another, Jerry Murdock, found them on his path toward spiritual relief.

“I was on a honeymoon in 2010 in Dharamshala, spending part of it in the palace with His Holiness the Dalai Lama, and on the way out of there we met Gyetrul Jigme Rinpoche, who’s the reincarnation of a saint named Pema Lingpa, and he said, ‘You’ve got to meet these two brothers I know!’ ” Murdock, a co-founder of Insight Partners, which holds one of the world’s largest venture-capital funds, told me. “So I would fly around to different cities of the world, and the Libermans would be there—London, New York, Geneva, Zermatt—and we would walk down the street and talk.” Small talk with the brothers veers toward big ideas; Murdock, having led an investment round in Twitter, asked them for their thoughts about the future of the platform. (The Libermans: Broaden it into a full-service mobile-messaging app—a role now filled by WhatsApp. Murdock: “It’s unfortunate that Twitter didn’t do that.”) Murdock boasted of a meeting between the brothers and the Dalai Lama. “The Dalai Lama seemed to like them a lot,” he said. “Then I introduced them to Richard Branson.”

The excitement that some people say they get from being with the Libermans can sound like other people’s episodes with psychedelic drugs. “There’s this blending of contrasting qualities—abstract global-transformation thinking combined with getting in there and debugging code,” Ken Caldeira, a leading climate scientist in whose guesthouse the Libermans once lived for several months, told me. The brothers’ specialty is reframing problems on a large scale by poring over minutiae, often with a turn of nerdy showmanship. (A characteristic post on their Instagram feed starts with a photograph of a shirtless Daniil and proceeds to ruminations on the second law of thermodynamics.) Born to two Soviet scientists, they wryly describe being “experimented on” during their youth, and at least one experiment—enrollment in the same grade, despite their age difference—had lasting effects. Today, the brothers answer messages, phone calls, and Zoom invites as a single entity, and haven’t been apart for more than some twenty days, then only because of a passport snafu. “We realized we are sort of a superhuman when we’re together,” Daniil said. At home, the brothers share a single king-size bed.

“In Russian, you can construct the phrase ‘thinking against’ someone else,” Daniil told me on the way to the Sheep Meadow, as I raced to keep up with them. “Or maybe it’s ‘by means of’?”

“That’s definitely been our personal life experience,” David said.

Like many people in technology, the Libermans also have personal life experience drawing financial success from a long series of failures. Their first major venture, in Moscow, was an online multiplayer video-game startup that crashed hard in the financial collapse of 2009. Chased by angry investors, they bid on a contract to animate an irreverent weekly sketch show called “Mult Lichnosti” (literally, “Cartoon Personalities”—in Russian, a pun on the phrase “personality cult”). The brothers, working with their two sisters, Anna and Maria, came up with a way of breaking down the animation workflow into tiny bits to animate half an hour of TV in just a few days. The show’s timely satire, often skewering the Kremlin, became an emblem of the loosening Medvedev years.

When it was cancelled, in 2012, at the outset of the second Putin Presidency, the brothers turned their sights to Hollywood, boarding a flight from Moscow to LAX every few weeks and scheduling back-to-back meetings. “We were meeting writers, meeting celebrities,” Daniil said. It didn’t last. “Nobody knew what to do with them,” said Josh Lieb, who, in an interlude between working as an executive producer on “The Daily Show with Jon Stewart” and the showrunner of “The Tonight Show Starring Jimmy Fallon,” teamed up with the Liberman brothers to work on animated shorts, a couple of pilots, and sketches drawn from the comic “Achewood,” none of which went anywhere. (Lieb later got them a brief gig consulting on “Silicon Valley.”) In 2014, tired of dead ends, the brothers left L.A. for the techie Bay Area.

There the Libermans launched a platform to help nonprofits be more transparent in their financials. That product flopped. They tried again with an augmented-reality startup, Kernel AR, that superimposed animated images on real-time video, and this one hit. In October, 2016, Kernel AR was acquired by Snap, which runs Snapchat. The company brought on the four Liberman siblings as product developers and created comparable technology as the basis for Snapchat’s 3-D Bitmoji, which lets users move cartoon avatars through the camera world, like a real-time Roger Rabbit. By 2018, more than half of users in the thirteen-to-thirty-four-year-old demographic were engaging with augmented-reality lenses such as 3-D Bitmoji each week, and the Libermans led a team in the company’s L.A. headquarters, receiving compensation partly in Snap shares.

Cartoon by Ellie Black
“Don’t even try to talk to me until I’ve had my moldy coffee filters.”

That year, Snapchat inexplicably began losing users. The price of Snap stock, which, in 2017, had gone public at twenty-four dollars a share, fell below six, and the Libermans watched their compensation shrivel. Inside the company, teams were dispatched to try to figure out what had gone wrong. The Liberman siblings had access to the same data as every other team, but they took an unusual tack, considering the timing of user loss and putting everything at the feet of a major rewrite of the Snapchat app for Android, which was running like molasses. The app was streamlined, Snapchat’s user base began to climb again, and by the time the Libermans had all left, in the spring of 2021, the company’s stock was trading at approximately sixty dollars. In the eyes of some people, their insight turned the company around. “That was the game changer for Snapchat, to reaccelerate growth and success,” Murdock, an investor, said. “And it came from the Libermans’ ideas.”

Now, after years of being ideas people to the world’s ideas people, the brothers had come to New York to fund-raise for a big and lucrative idea of their own. In Central Park, they told me that, with Maria and Anna, they’d created an entity called Libermans Co. It held all the income from their enterprises; any debts, assets, and profits they might gain; and any investments they might make or companies they might start for the next thirty years. They had gathered all these elements and sold shares in the whole, offering investors, effectively, a stake in their entire financial future—shares in their life. So far, the Libermans have traded around three per cent of their futures, which investors have valued at four hundred million dollars, or about a hundred million dollars per Liberman. They spent a few months in conversation with the Securities and Exchange Commission to list themselves on the stock market, which they hope to do by 2023.

“It’s a proof of concept in an extreme way,” David told me.

“It probably sounds stupid—‘rich guys from the tech world become even richer,’ ” Daniil said. (According to the personal tax returns they show to prospective investors—the brothers live two separate lives in the eyes of the I.R.S.—each has a yearly income in the seven figures.)

Improbably, though, the Libermans see this endeavor as part of an effort to stem twenty-first-century inequality. If they can sell life shares, they think, others can, too. “We’re between worlds, and it allows us to be in both skins,” Daniil said. “In the skin of people used to the way capital usually works, and in today’s world, which requires something new.”

America is now beset by twinned and yet somewhat opposing beliefs: that the country has not delivered on its promise of financial opportunity for all, and that the institutions empowered to deliver on that promise are untrustworthy and beside the point. Seniors as a group have grown wealthier for years, while people younger than thirty-five are poorer. Student debt has roughly doubled just in the past decade; Pew finds that trust in government is falling toward an all-time low. This mistrust seems to transcend ethnicity, age, and partisanship, and its sway on ideas in personal finance is plain. Young people now create personal brands online and trade cryptocurrencies, N.F.T.s, and other unregulated direct-market products to try to make a buck. The Libermans and their idea of helping others get ahead by selling futures on the market are the avatars of this era’s desperate reach.

In Playa Vista, the brothers live somewhere called the Villas: a vast housing development, lined with palm trees and banana plants, that looks not unlike a Soviet apartment block transplanted to paradise. It was warm when I arrived one afternoon, with breezes wafting in off the Pacific. Daniil was wrapped in a scarf and a thick winter coat. He hadn’t consumed anything but water for seven days, in an effort to treat a chronic sinus infection that he attributed to earlier, more stressful periods of his youth. He had been suffering in silence when a friend claimed that water fasting helped his acne. Daniil tried it. “My nostrils were opened for the first time in seven years!” he said. Now he did a weeklong fast once every three months. “The body definitely thinks you’re dying,” he said cheerily, wiping some drips from his nose. Then, as the home chef and epicurean of the pair, he yanked open the refrigerator to fix David lunch.

The brothers had invited me to set up shop in their spare bedroom, on the premise that almost all their important work was done around the house. The proposal was irregular, but so was everything about their situation, and after some chin-rubbing conversations at the magazine it was agreed I should accept. The room was outfitted with a low berth, a desk, a paperback book (“You Are the Music: How Music Reveals What It Means to Be Human”), and a hose-like apparatus for steam-pressing suits. I peered into the closet, which had sliding mirrored doors, and found it filled with wine bottles of carbonated tea: the brothers don’t drink alcohol, and bestow fizzy tea on everyone they know, for toasts.

I went back to the kitchen. Daniil was serving David soup and cold cuts the color of wet hay. (The brothers are vegetarians, mostly for climate-protection reasons.) Except for a kitchen table, a generic gray L-shaped couch, a massage chair, and a garish hot-pink rug, the space was basically empty. “We usually leave the apartment unlocked,” Daniil said. “There’s nothing to steal, and our friends in other apartments sometimes come to use our printer.”

I asked some questions while David talked over his cooling soup and Daniil, easing off his fast, sipped a steaming, murky green fluid from a mug that said “adult-ing is hard.” The heart of their thinking, they began to explain, was a belief that younger generations were disempowered.

“This is our major idea,” David said. “But then there are a lot of projects in, uh—”

“Branches,” Daniil said, reaching out to butter David’s toast.

“—a variety of branches of this idea, which we constantly are, uh, uh—”

“Testing.”

“—testing or experimenting with,” David went on. “If you move here from outside, especially if you want to build projects, you quite immediately experience that—”

“The opportunities are enormous!” Daniil said.

“—the market is bigger,” David went on. “Also—”

“Go eat!” Daniil told him sternly, and David bowed his head and began slurping soup. Then he popped up again.

“All the conversation was about how in debt young people are!” David said.

The brothers understood the feeling of being pinioned. Their father, Efim Arsentievich Liberman, had been a prodigy who enrolled in university early, trained as a physicist, and became—to the extent that a Jew in Soviet Russia could be—a leading scientist of his day. During the Cold War, he played a key role in engineering the guidance system for the V-750VN surface-to-air missiles that shot down the U-2 spy plane flown by Francis Gary Powers. In middle age, Efim had turned to biophysics, focussing on neurotransmission, and had won the U.S.S.R. State Prize, the highest honor for a Soviet scientist. The brothers’ mother, Svetlana V. Minina, was Efim’s third wife—the Libermans have three older half brothers—and gave birth to six children in eight years while earning her Ph.D., in biophysics. (I asked the brothers how such a thing was done. “Grandparents,” they told me.)

In the nineteen-eighties, Efim’s relationship with the Soviet leadership soured; meanwhile, government funding for science dried up. The family income, never great, collapsed. The Liberman siblings began sleeping together in one room, occasionally sharing the space with habitats for snails and goldfish that their parents used for research. Around this time, the brothers said, they started feeling different from the other kids at school. They had a personal computer, a vestige of their father’s previous work, and they would stay up late playing games and trying to write code. “We broke the computer a lot, so we had to learn how to fix it,” Daniil recalled. It seemed their portal to a smarter, faster, more connected world.

For two years, during the worst of Russia’s early-nineties depression, the family relied on the food that their mother had stockpiled. In 1998, two weeks before the ruble plunged and the government defaulted on its domestic debts, she converted the family’s meagre savings to U.S. dollars. (Svetlana, who still lives in Moscow, declined to answer questions for this article.) Such desperate measures seemed to safeguard their survival. The brothers told me that their first big project, as teen-agers, was organizing their apartment block to run fibre-optic cable, and that effort grew into an Internet-service-provider company. After university, they became interested in data algorithms, including one that predicted the subterranean composition of land plots—in theory, a technology that could be useful in finding oil—and built another project around that. Russia’s Federal Security Service (F.S.B.) found the subterranean work strange, and looked into it. When the brothers protested that they were just computer geeks with a good algorithm, the F.S.B., they say, tried to enlist them for dark hacking.

The Libermans insist that they have only ever done white-hat hacking (that is, probing to find vulnerabilities that should be fixed), but they define that standard broadly. The supercomputing abilities that enabled them to run complex geological algorithms, they confessed to me, came from tapping into the processing power of idle computers on their network. The F.S.B.’s scrutiny spooked them, so they started a company around something that, in the early two-thousands, they were sure no serious people would scrutinize: video games.

The going was rough. “We’d never worked with a two-hundred-person team before,” Daniil said. “We raised more and more money without releasing the game—and then the financial crisis came.

“We kind of felt like idiots,” he went on. “How could we have missed the world financial crisis?”

Looking at the data, they landed on the same culprit as many people had: the deregulation, in the late nineties, of derivatives and related credit-default swaps. “But then we were, like, O.K., why were they deregulated?” Daniil said. “And who was the beneficiary?” The brothers coded algorithms to trawl data from the Federal Reserve. By far, it seemed to them, the biggest holders of wealth in the United States were pension funds, which collect, invest, and deliver money for people’s pensions. They concluded that the country’s pension funds together held roughly forty trillion dollars, or a sum twice the size of the entire U.S. economy.

That insight wasn’t new. In “The Unseen Revolution” (1976), the corporate theorist Peter Drucker had noted that pension funds control “practically every single one of the 1,000 largest industrial corporations in America” through their share ownership. The Libermans observed that the funds had continued to grow into the twenty-first century, which in their view explained a lot. The rising cost of education? One factor was that many educational institutions have fixed-return pension funds, so, whenever the markets underperform, the institutions go to their own pockets. The declining wealth of younger generations? Pension funds were good and necessary, the Libermans believed, but they had become ominously oversized, as had the corporations that they controlled. Wealth was draining toward major shareholders and the old.

Cartoon by Ellis Rosen
“You came here from a distant planet to ‘study humanity,’ but God forbid you help around the house.”

To the brothers, this circumstance—what some people would call capitalist gerontocracy—was an example of the longitudinal-inequality problem writ large, and, as they bounced ideas back and forth, they shared an epiphany. The core of the imbalance, they thought, was an asymmetry in how we measure wealth.

When we measure the wealth of people, we tote up their cash, assets, and debts on a given day and take that as their worth—even if we know they’ll earn more going forward. When, on the other hand, investors value corporations, such as Costco, they take into account the company’s likely growth, and figure out a price for a share with that future in mind. (Costco is priced at forty times its current earnings.) Corporations are allowed to worm their wealth forward and backward in time by selling shares. In theory, people can do this through debt, but debt is psychologically onerous and rarely encourages personal risk-taking. The Libermans convinced themselves that, if you let people move their future wealth value around the way corporations do, people and businesses would be more evenly matched.

The brothers shopped the idea around for years, but it wasn’t until recently that reception to it warmed. Sam Lessin, a venture capitalist at Slow Ventures, was the first investor to buy shares of the Libermans’ future. He grew up in a prosperous family and, as a teen-ager, was struck by the fact that he could go to whatever college he wanted, while smart kids without the same financial security might be compelled to select schools on the basis of tuition and aid options. For years, he proposed to investors the idea of “venture capital for people,” to no avail. Then, as the debt crisis deepened, he noticed the wind beginning to turn. Lessin’s firm recently opened a whole department devoted to investing in human lives. To the extent that many investors remain skeptical, it is often for market reasons. “That idea might be ten years too early—or more,” Jerry Murdock told me. “We’re not in a deep enough crisis of talent.”

One Saturday morning, the brothers got in their white Tesla Model Y bearing the license plate “libermn,” and drove to Westwood to meet their friend Oleg Itskhoki, another Muscovite, who is a professor of economics at U.C.L.A. On the way, they stopped to pick up Mehreen Malik, a partner in their project, whom I already knew. When the Libermans drive, Daniil is at the wheel, and David stares out the window. Later, they say, their experiences blend, as if in stereoscope, into one memory. (The brothers also read books two by two; they each carry a bank card from a joint account.) If they ever get in a serious quarrel, they observe a brief period of silence, bracket the dispute, and get on with their shared life. What else could they do? “We understand that what we get from each other is so much more than we could get alone,” Daniil said.

Malik clambered into the car at a crowded Beverly Hills corner. “You’ve both had a haircut! I think I preferred both of your hair longer,” she said. “You could either pass for mad scientists or go to a Beck concert.”

“This is a long process,” David said. “I cut the hairs now. Then I don’t cut them—”

“They won’t be cut for another year!” Daniil declared, with American brevity. Most of their social circle in town consists of other entrepreneurial Slavic expats. (The brothers spent much of the spring trying to evacuate friends from Russia and Ukraine.) Lilian Caldeira, Ken Caldeira’s wife, who knew the extended Liberman family, describes them as being in a swirl of intellectual life in Russia—Efim, their father, was an inspiration for a character in Ludmila Ulitskaya’s novel of seventies Moscow, “Jacob’s Ladder”—but the brothers built their own swirl over a recurring match of Mafia, the millennial parlor game. Frequent players called themselves the Libermafia, and the term stuck to describe their ever-growing network. “You need to be three months ahead to make a reservation for their spare bedroom,” Lilian Caldeira told me.

Itskhoki, whom they met that day, recently won the Clark Medal, the nation’s top honor for young economists, for his work on exchange rates and the influence of globalization on income inequality. He was the youngest tenured economist at Princeton before moving with his wife to the West Coast when she got a job there. “I went surfing the other day. My transition to Californian is complete,” he announced as they stopped at a shaggy Westwood café. He wore a terry-cloth Hawaiian shirt and a baseball cap that said “camp know where.” After a walking tour of the U.C.L.A. campus, Itskhoki led the group to a lush quadrangle near David Smith’s sculpture “Cubi XX,” where they sat in a big circle on the grass. David, warmed by the sun, gushed about Itskhoki’s research knowledge. “It’s always really interesting to, uh—”

“Find,” Daniil said, not looking up from a tiny fort he was building out of pine needles and eucalyptus buttons.

“—find what are the current ideas in academia about, for example, generational gaps in wealth and the role debt plays in this,” he said.

“There are surprisingly few,” Itskhoki said. “We think of ‘families’ and inequality between ‘households.’ We talk in terms of top ten, top one, top 0.1 per cent. We think a lot less of the unit being people older than fifty.” And yet age is crucial, he added. “Most wage growth happens in your twenties and thirties, so, if your twenties and thirties miss a time of high economic growth, you’re—statistically speaking—stuck with low wages for the rest of your life.”

That realization, he said, was part of the reason for economists’ recent academic interest in “a broad wealth tax,” to push wealth created in periods of high economic growth into the valleys.

The brothers were quiet for a long moment. A wealth tax, in fact, could disrupt their scheme: young people, valued by shares in their own futures, would be taxed as wealthy before they’d ever been rich. Finally, David said, “We’re on the side of, yes, maybe something will change in regulation and taxation, but how can you rebalance it from the market perspective? Adding a new type of security to help young people get wealth is another approach to the same problem.”

Redistribution—the idea that grossly imbalanced wealth should be spread to help the needy become less so—has traditionally been the province of the political center and the left, which believe in taxes and a safety net administered through the state. The Libermans say that their market-based approach can potentially move more wealth (the big money has been known to resist taxes, but is all in for investment) and weave its own networks of support. In one conceivable scenario, an aspiring folksinger of twenty-two decides, like the Libermans, to offer shares in her life. The shares are cheap—the monetary value of her future is uncertain—yet they attract some investors, because maybe she’s the next Taylor Swift: she’s high-risk, high-reward. Thanks to the investments, she can now afford a new head shot and the time of a well-connected producer. She has a bit of cash left over, so she buys a share (also cheap) in the future of her best folksinging friend. Ten years pass, and her work pays the rent. She sells a few more shares, at a higher valuation: her future value is now a vector based on measurable success.

A decade later, she releases her fifth album, full of candid songs about middle age. The album speaks to a generation and goes platinum. The price of a share in her future has now gone through the roof.

Or maybe it’s her friend who made it big. Our folksinger is envious all the way to the bank. She sells the share in her friend she bought long ago at a profit of a few hundred thousand dollars, and makes a down payment on her first home. Now it’s her friend’s success that’s keeping her creative life afloat.

Or—the likeliest of all—nothing happens, and so she finds a job in another line. Investors, as they would do with the stock of any pivoting company, might decide to hold or to sell at a loss; she owes them nothing, though she got some extra funding on the way.

The Libermans’ theory is that, in terms of stuff that America’s big wealth can invest in, people are more appealing than the current catalogue of middling venture-capital funds, shipping firms, and companies selling toothbrushes by mail. Instead of putting money into a fund for startups, investors would be free to find an ingenious entrepreneur and invest in her entire career. Rather than buying shares of Spotify, a fund could buy into a portfolio of the futures of emerging hip-hop artists, all of whom would get that cash. Most of us are more excited about our brilliant friends than about the companies they work for. And while the average age of an S. & P. 500 company is approximately twenty years—most die young—people do better. The stronger their boost off the blocks, the longer they can keep trying, increasing their odds of success.

Some new egalitarians speak of “basic capital” models (as opposed to basic income), the idea being that it’s more equalizing to grant people an early chunk of capital that they can grow than a steady drip. But the idea is old. In 1750, Dr. Johnson described a supposed tavern friend of his who observed that “it was not worse to have ten thousand pounds at the age of two and twenty years, than a much larger fortune at thirty; for many opportunities, says he, occur of improving money, which if a man misses, he may not afterwards recover.” People generally give up their dreams not because they’re sure they’ll never realize them but because money pressures close in. That those pressures are uneven—a scion with a trust fund gets more tries at making it in a risky but rewarding venture than an orphan with monthly rent to cover—is one way inequalities compound.

Juliana Uhuru Bidadanure, a professor of philosophy and political science at Stanford and the faculty director of the university’s Basic Income Lab, told me that she finds the Libermans’ model interesting in its premise, “especially if you live in a society that’s very unequal in terms of wealth, like the U.S., where a lot of life plans aren’t possible if you don’t actually have cash early on.” In her recent book, “Justice Across Ages: Treating Young and Old as Equals,” she assesses differences between the generations both in the long arc (between the lifetime experiences of young and old) and in the moment (how the young and the old relate). But although Bidadanure thinks the Libermans’ model is attentive to the first kind of age-based inequality, she told me, she doubts its effects on the second, especially when everyone is jockeying for an investment. “If the young have to present themselves in a particular way to the older generations so that they will find their life trajectory appealing, I could totally see how there could be a social hierarchy you typically just have between benefactors and those who receive those funds,” she said.

The Libermans’ idea echoes one examined by Milton Friedman, in 1962, and has many other siblings. In 1997, David Bowie famously issued so-called Bowie bonds, ten-year securities offering shares in his future royalties, and raised fifty-five million dollars that he used to buy back old songs, theoretically increasing his future value. Income-sharing agreements, in which organizations fund aspiring young people in exchange for a portion of their lifetime income, are gaining popularity, especially in professional sports. And, at the height of the crowdfunding craze, a scheme known as human-capital contracts let investors give money to promising youths—usually through middleman companies such as Upstart—in exchange for a percentage of their future incomes. The traditional knock against such schemes has been that they’re exploitative or worse, a form of indentured servitude; what the authors of all these contracts share is being powerful and rich. The emeritus Yale economics professor and Nobel laureate Robert Shiller, who has written such books as “Finance and the Good Society,” notes that other, related ideas, such as loans that don’t have to be repaid below certain income points, are designed to let risk be borne mostly by those who can afford it.

The Libermans’ own life-shares deal—a prototype for their model—does not involve income sharing. Direct liquidity happens when the Libermans cash out (say, to buy a house); at that point, there’s a proportional distribution, meaning that if I own two per cent of the Libermans I get two per cent of the cash. (This works a bit like a dividend and is a reason you might still want to hold stock when the Libermans are old and less productive.) When they die, everything is distributed, unless the shareholders vote to keep their life operation going. Otherwise, shareholders have no vote in anything the Libermans do.

“The only thing we say is ‘Please, be successful!’ ” Daniil said. When I asked him what would keep people from selling shares and going to drink Daiquiris on the beach, he told me that presumably a few will. But that’s unlikely to faze high-risk, high-reward investors, who expect some promising cards in their deck to end up duds. Nor is this the wisest move for the Daiquiri drinkers, because the initial money would run out, and the shares of an inveterate beach bum are hardly an appealing investment. In the short term, though, sometimes a beach sabbatical is a wonderful thing. When you’re investing in a whole career, insuring health, happiness, and stamina is good business.

Practice seldom matches theory. One economist told me he doubts that normal people, even with technical protections, could be free of shareholder influence. (“There is reason to expect that a system that starts out that way will evolve under pressure from investors,” he said. “We saw this with changes in bankruptcy law in 2005 that gave the holders of credit-card debt more power vis-à-vis credit-card debtors by making it harder to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7.”) As most C.E.O.s know, not even success brings freedom from shareholder pressure.

“When a founder takes V.C. money for their company, they suddenly have pressure to make the company, and the financial return for the investors, as big as possible,” Arielle Zuckerberg, a general partner at Long Journey Ventures (and a sister of the Facebook co-founder), told me. “Some individuals, I think, continue trying to make a company something that it shouldn’t be.” She committed to buying shares of the Libermans’ future at her previous firm, because she thought it would help them break from this pattern. Yet for Zuckerberg it is the brothers’ willingness to cast themselves endlessly back on the grindstone that makes them worth investing in. “The question is, does this individual have almost uncapped upside—because they’re addicted to building, have tons of ideas?” she said. Or are they merely aiming for comfort? “Some people have a number.”

Iexpected to find the Libermans living in either zany techie excess or monkish monomania, but their days in Playa Vista were predictable and quiet. The brothers like to get eight hours of sleep a night (“our sweet spot,” David told me). They generally rise sometime after eight, do calisthenics, breakfast on porridge or yogurt with berries, and start on the day’s work, which involves video meetings and hunkering down into the details of coding software. Lately, they have been drafting an introduction-to-coding book based on an online class that David teaches. (Coding, they think, is too often taught at an overly technical level, so instead they show people how to read the full code for familiar apps, edit it, and then write programs of their own.) Most days, at 4 p.m., they walk along the same route: through a fancy office park called the Campus; past a soccer field, a playground, and man-made ponds; and on to an overgrown creekside trail that leads them to the house where their sister Maria, known as Masha, lives with her husband and two children.

With long dark hair, big glasses, and a calm, wise-child manner, Masha struck me as resembling the heroine of a Roald Dahl book as drawn by Quentin Blake. For a long time, she told me, she wanted nothing to do with her weird brothers; as a young woman in Moscow, she had founded and run a respected N.G.O. for Russian-Jewish studies. Then, around 2007, she joined their businesses. At her table, she served us delicate fruity tea and a sharlotka, apple cake in the crisped, fluffy Russian style. David wolfed it down.

Cartoon by Juan Astasio

Within the family, Daniil and David are understood to be the public faces of the Liberman brand—jet-setting, social-media-influencing—while Masha and her sister, Anna, who is based in London, work from home at the Liberman companies, increasing value. (The sisters tried being limelight-dwellers for a while, but disliked the scrutiny and the travel.) When I asked the brothers whether they, too, aspired to marry and multiply, they told me yes, but there were obvious challenges. Most sane people didn’t enjoy being perpetual third wheels to the brothers’ all-consuming intellectual, professional, and domestic partnership. “There’s kind of a jealousy, usually—like, ‘You spend more time with your brother and your family than with me,’ ” Daniil reported. “Our answer is ‘Come join the family!’ ” Unsurprisingly, this never works.

The brothers call Masha the mastermind, and she’s the one working with lawyers to steer the life shares through the S.E.C., a process she describes as smooth so far. (The S.E.C. declined to comment.) Libermans Co. is a holding company incorporated in Delaware. All four participating Libermans assign the holding company their current rights, titles, interests, and major intellectual property. (Notably, they don’t turn over all their previous personal wealth.) They commit all their startups, private-market investments and sales, salaries, bonuses, commissions, and equity in the next thirty years, but there are exceptions: each Liberman is allowed to purchase his or her own real estate, to hold on to up to three hundred thousand dollars in income each year, and to put money in public stocks and mutual funds. (The sisters, who have children, worried about gambling everything on a thirty-year experiment.) For the moment, there is double taxation, but the hope is that, if the model catches on, it will get its own tax rules.

Masha poured more tea and checked in with her brothers about a meeting they’d had on behalf of their company Product Science. Within the big holding company, the Libermans run several smaller startups, all of which have comically bland names, like a Bond villain’s corporate front. They built Product Science after leaving Snap, and it centers on an algorithm that plants flags to help engineers accelerate app run times. One of the brothers’ parlor tricks for prospective clients is to show videos in which they cold-launch popular apps on an older phone with a stopwatch running. Snapchat and other Libermanized apps load in less than two seconds. Investors were told that if they wanted in on Product Science they really should buy shares in Libermans Co. By this spring, twenty-five investors had put a total of $17.5 million into Product Science, which has greatly boosted the return on the Libermans’ four lives.

Not long afterward, the brothers rose early and drove the Libermobile to LAX, for a flight to visit friends and colleagues in San Francisco. “I’ve been having the strangest dreams,” Daniil said as he drove. “Last night, I dreamed that David and I were working in a factory, making some new, magical plastic. I woke up and started Googling ‘plastic’ and discovered in Nature magazine an article about a new kind of polymer.” They had changed their clothes for the first time since I’d arrived in town, and Daniil was now back in the green Pokémon florals, with golden high-tops.

The “magical plastic” dream was typical; by then, I’d come to recognize a quixotic strain in the brothers which was characteristic of Silicon Valley, but also of their family line. In the late fifties, Efim Liberman claimed to have figured out how the ocular nerve transmitted different colors to the brain with a pattern of impulses over time. This tiny fact, in his view, had big implications, because an interval signal, being a system of encoding, implies computation—something we’re taught happens across neural networks, not in single cells. Efim and Svetlana became convinced that computation did happen in one cell, and devoted their late careers to a theory, which they called chaimatics (as in “L’chaim! ”), based on the idea that the encoding of proteins is just one part of a larger DNA- and RNA-based information-processing system. In time, chaimatics grew into a sort of theory of everything, drawing in quantum mechanics, cognition, and ideas about consciousness. The theory lacked adherents when Efim died, in 2011; Rava Azeredo da Silveira, a physicist who works on cognitive science and theoretical neuroscience at the École Normale Supérieure and at the Institute of Molecular and Clinical Ophthalmology, in Basel, told me that, while much of Efim’s early experiments and speculations were “well guided,” the later neuroscientific and cognitive ideas peeled away from engagement with scientific literature, drifting out toward notions “described in such vague, if not esoteric, terms that they border on the meaningless.”

On the plane, a flight attendant passed by with drinks, and Daniil ordered tea, black, with a water. He held up two fingers without looking: same again for his brother.

“And cookies,” David said.

On the curb at the San Francisco airport, they commandeered another white Tesla, this one rented through Turo. In their own car, the brothers liked to play Billie Eilish’s “My Future” (“I’m in love with my future, / can’t wait to meet her”) and bob their heads, but now they talked about being early advocates of the so-called sharing economy, and Airbnb in particular. They’d grown circumspect about the company when it did little to discourage landlords from buying up several apartments and running them as unofficial hotels. The brilliance of the Airbnb idea, in their view, had been its use of what was already available to meet other people’s needs, lowering the cost for everyone—

Suddenly, the rented Tesla was gaining speed in self-driving mode, doing eighty miles per hour in the left lane on the soft bends of 280, and the brothers were talking over each other, trying to explain what their foray into the sharing economy had taught them. Didn’t doubling, tripling, quadrupling of use—and therefore benefit—exist for many things? Consider software. It takes a lot of time and effort to write the program Microsoft Word, but, once it exists, millions of people can use it, at a cost of basically nothing to the company. Or consider the movies: a lot of work and money go into making one final cut that is then copied endlessly. It’s one big climb, followed by easy street, and it characterizes digital production. When you held that model against the current marketplace, you noticed misalignments. “For example, Netflix was growing its audience, but at the same time it was growing its subscription price,” David said excitedly. “It made no sense.” (Consumers have lately seemed to agree: the service has lost users.) “The only reason Netflix is able to do that is that it has a monopolistic position provided by a social agreement—the copyright!” Daniil exclaimed. The Libermans envisioned capping movie profits at a sum—say, a hundred million dollars—after which a film would enter the public domain. This would let copyright owners know what they were getting, and get it faster, because now everyone had a shared interest in pushing a movie toward public ownership.

The brothers first experimented with profit capping at one of their companies in 2015. But the soaring idea came down to earth for them in 2019, when OpenAI, an artificial-intelligence nonprofit co-founded by one of their friends, Greg Brockman, raised a billion dollars in funding, and capped its investors’ returns. (Everything beyond the cap goes to the nonprofit.) Investors liked the idea, because it let an enterprise like OpenAI compete with companies such as Google in research without selling out its nonprofit principles: a big boon for recruitment, among other things.

At a vegan-sushi restaurant in San Francisco, the brothers met with Marina Mogilko, an upbeat Russian-expat YouTuber in whose life they themselves have bought shares. At twenty-one, she had co-founded a kind of Expedia for language-immersion packages. Now, as a thirty-two-year-old influencer, she taught foreigners how to speak and act like Americans. (“You’re going to exaggerate your happiness a little, because that’s what America is about,” she instructs.) She has more than six million subscribers, and the Libermans bought part of her future at a total valuation of around thirty-four million dollars. At first, she didn’t know what she would do with the money, but in time she hired producers, a Parisian stylist, and a P.R. manager, and this staffing brought her success of a sort. Mogilko was about to fly to New York to be photographed in a yellow bodysuit for the cover of Bulgarian Glamour. “I feel as if I’m playing a game and keep rising to another level,” she told me.

Aprinciple known as the Modigliani-Miller theorem says that, in a perfect market, a company’s value will be the same whether it finances its growth only by selling shares or by also taking on debt. By this logic, Mogilko would have got the same boost through a loan. (Practically, in fact, she might come out ahead: most debt financing costs less than venture capital.) The Libermans say that the difference is psychological, and in where the money is coming from. But their model isn’t so much digging young people out of their predicament as replacing one kind of weight with another. The vulnerable are still vulnerable, and it remains a long way from the bottom to the top.

The life-shares model supports people like the Libermans and Mogilko, who find a spark in dreaming and are able to climb career ladders. In their case, access and connections will pay off. For millions of Americans struggling to find a basic job, the prospect of locating willing investors and deal lawyers seems a moon shot, and the big money will stay out of reach. A top-level librarian earning a hundred thousand dollars a year will have an income value of three million dollars over thirty years. Given the growth of money over time, an investor would put that life’s current value at around four hundred thousand dollars, or, for a five-per-cent share, twenty thousand dollars—small recompense for a piece of one’s lifelong daily work.

“Yes, if you’re the kind of person who wants to work at a job you love and it’s predictable how much money you’re going to make, it’s a bad instrument,” Sam Lessin, the venture capitalist, told me. “It works only when someone can squint and say, O.K., you’ll probably fail, but if you work we’re going to make a ton of money.” The dream is big, in that sense, but the group of the lucky is small, and it is probably not a good thing that everybody else—librarians, teachers, nurses, civil servants—are the people who hold a society together. Those in desperation reach for desperate measures, sometimes with destabilizing results.

The period when the Libermans’ parents’ idea of chaimatics took its most audacious public turn, toward a theory of everything, was the period when the family’s finances began to approach collapse. Their children, half a world from that tiny Moscow apartment, still think that Efim and Svetlana are right about their science—they had never known their parents to be seriously wrong before. The implications of cellular computing, if true, could be enormous, they believe, but proving that could take decades: too long to woo investors seeking returns. The value of the idea was one that the market couldn’t hold.

The brothers told me that they planned to use the wealth they got from Libermans Co. to fund a lab for chaimatics—a continuation of the work their family had begun long ago. The idea was outlandish, but they were used to that. The work might seem too interdisciplinary, but so was everything their family did. It had occurred to the brothers that, after decades of research, their parents could be proved wrong. But that was O.K., they said; that was the thrill of science. All the money in the world could carry you only so far. ♦

Nathan Heller began contributing to The New Yorker in 2011 and joined the magazine as a staff writer in 2013

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