Monday, 30 May 2022

Bitter Fruit

no. 63 | The Baffler
The palm oil industry remakes Guatemala

WHEN THE Q’EQCHI’ FIRST MOVED NORTHWARD, to a place then uninhabited, the land was tranquil and bountiful. There was maize to harvest, leafy hierba mora to forage, deer and the spotted tepezcuintle rodent to hunt. If you wanted fish, there were plenty. If you needed water for cooking, bathing, or drinking, it was abundant. But there was a rule: no one was to submerge themselves in the small river that cut a winding path through the indigenous community’s new land. There was no name for this seeming paradise, so the self-described community of believers turned to a place that Jesus once walked and christened the village Palestina II—the second Palestine. There was no way to know then that a blessing could become a curse.


Beneath the shade of a thatched-roof palapa, the glowing embers of a low burning fire at its center, Maria Alciro Bolon stirs a blackened pot of atol de plátano—a thick, spiced plantain drink—from which steam rises in swirls amid the torpid September air. Around her, tan and black mutts slink under tables in search of scraps and affection. A teenage girl molds fresh dough into round tortillas. Outside, a water delivery truck rumbles along the white gravel road that skirts the outdoor kitchen and divides the center of Palestina II.

In lilting Q’eqchi’, Bolon, a community leader, welcomes a dozen or so women, each wearing a bright lace huipil top and woven skirt that skims the ankles. Some arrive with babies slung across their backs, their dark hair tousled by sweat. With a broad, gummy smile, Bolon greets Maria Tec Pop—an older woman with dark hair pulled taut at the nape of her neck and gold stars pressed into her front teeth. Both hold a seniority that stretches back to the founding of their village some thirty years ago. They remember a time when everyone had land to cultivate, when the water was carried by current and not by truck. They remember Rudy—the man with the light-colored eyes.

He was an intermediary. A ladino. Someone who was not indigenous, as they were. He arrived in Palestina II hoping to buy land from a community who had only just acquired it. During Guatemala’s thirty-six-year civil war, Bolon, Tec Pop, and many other Q’eqchi’ left their native home in the region of Alta Verapaz and followed the mountain’s slope north to the country’s largest department, the Petén. In the southern swath of this green sea, in the place they called Palestina II, they found the land they had been systemically denied elsewhere. It would be theirs to borrow, to pass on, Bolon says. When Rudy made his offer, the community refused it. As a people repeatedly displaced for some five hundred years, a people who bind the word loq’laj, or sacred, to ch’och’, or land, the Q’eqchi’ would not cede it so easily. They did not expect that the ultimate deceit would come from one of their own.

Now seated on a wooden bench, with Tec Pop to her right and a tower of empty plastic cups, sticky with atol, on a table to her left, Bolon tells me about the man from Palestina II. Tasked with persuading the community to sell their land, he promised they would be paid very well. Some, trusting their neighbor, decided to sell and made hopeful plans to rent land elsewhere. Others refused. Then came the threats. As each plot of maize, each square of tilled earth, was encircled by private property, families such as Bolon’s were warned that should they cross land they did not own, something might happen. In Guatemala, such implications are not made without intent, and one by one, most people in Palestina II agreed to sell. But two families fought to keep their land. One of them was Bolon’s.

At the furthest boundary of her family’s home—past the palapa, past the muddied, free roaming chickens, past the children climbing skinny trees that buckle beneath their feet—begins a contested terrain. It is an uninterrupted landscape of short, stout palms that unfold in waves of curved frond and feathered leaf. Each former patch of family farm in Palestina II has become part of a palm plantation, transforming a harvest of subsistence into one of capital. It has placed the hunger of a global industry on Bolon’s doorstep. And even the protected, the revered, is now imperiled.

Bordered by palms, the only river in Palestina II is an opaque, oil-slicked symbol of what has been lost. Once used for cooking, cleaning, bathing, and drinking, the river’s water is now said to cause unexplained fish die-offs and irritating rashes that spread across the body. The skin bleeds, I am told. The women of Palestina II suspect it is the palm pesticides and poison used to keep rats at bay. They have told the company, Nacional Agro Industrial, S.A., that the plantations inch too close to their homes and their river. They have spoken of it, again and again, making their desire, their unwavering demand, known—the palms should not be here. But no one will listen, Bolon says. The companies do not care about the people of Palestina II. It is the fortune of a few pitted against the burden of many. And the palm oil industry is nothing if not rapacious.

Making a Killing

It is something of a universal truth that in 2022, palm oil is as ubiquitous as it is despised. Every palm economy, from the burgeoning industry in Guatemala to the epicenter in Indonesia, is plagued by problems borne from and enabled by the world’s appetite for cheap vegetable fat. Industrial palm oil is now found in about 50 percent of supermarket products, from cookies and peanut butter to shampoo and lipstick. While the oil itself, extracted from the flesh of the red, bulbous palm fruit, is a beloved local staple across its native West Africa, the industrial ingredient—the version most people consume—is the byproduct of violent processes inflicted on man and earth.

Families such as Bolon’s were warned that should they cross land they did not own, something might happen.

Land grabs displace communities. Monocultures strip biodiversity. Pesticides poison waterways. Workers are exploited for cheap labor in dangerous jobs. Some prosper, most do not. Dissenters are silenced. Palm oil is produced. Profits are made. It is a cycle steeped in colonialism and perfected by modern global capitalism, a cycle that relies on the violence of extraction to succeed. It is no coincidence that across the world in 2020, the number of land defenders killed while opposing agribusiness matched those killed while opposing mining and other extractive industries.

But even manufactured landscapes require more than brute force to succeed. In the palm oil industry, image control is a means of survival, and what is said—on billboards, at meetings, online—can be even more nefarious than what is done. Corporate interests are branded as sustainability. Unmet promises are advertised as reality. And the world, desperate for a reprieve, deems these efforts a “solution.” But someone like Bolon knows otherwise.

Toward the end of the palapa gathering, before a lunch of chicken soup—the best parts divided evenly amongst those present, as is the Q’eqchi’ way—I ask if the palm plantations have brought any benefits to Palestina II. A room full of women shake their heads. Bolon says that whatever I have been told is not true. She has been invited to something called an “environmental workshop”—an event met with indignation by the indigenous community. She has seen the roadside billboards that announce the palm company’s acts of charity: a new water tank installed, a dirt road repaired. She has even been to meetings at which the company boasts about these very contributions, about all they have done and all they have spent. But the palms still surround the homes of Palestina II. The river is still unusable. The threats still hang heavy. No one is fooled.

“We have nothing,” Bolon says. “And they are the ones who are killing us.”

Chainsaw Massacre

About an hour north of Palestina II, the town of Sayaxché tumbles forth from the banks of the River Pasión, a cacophony of crowded buses, dusty country trucks, and cramped two-wheeled motos that sway along wide dirt roads. Sayaxché is something of an agro-industrial frontier, where street vendors hawk raw chickens and used bras, men in high-crowned cowboy hats chat outside carnicerías, and stores adorned with hand-painted signs advertise everything from the cost of a haircut to Bayer pesticides. On a stifling Sunday morning, halfway down a street of hotels and tiendas, I meet Ramiro Hernández at the town’s most popular café.

A local leader elected to a rural community development council known as a COCODE, Hernández arrived in Sayaxché in early 1986 planning to stay just a few months. Then he saw the trees, the deer, the river, the coyotes, and fell in love with a place that was then beautiful. But about six years into his pastoral life, Hernández began to hear chainsaws. There was a constant and unfamiliar revving, whining and slicing through the peace of his chosen home. It used to take quite some time to fell a tree. Men equipped with a few saws and an ax would build beds among the branches while they cut thick, towering cedar and mahogany from top to bottom. But with the arrival of chainsaws, people were hacking through the forest fast, destroying, destroying, destroying, Herndández says, until there was nothing left.

At the time, the Petén—making up one third of Guatemala but home to around 3 percent of its population—already had some exposure to palm oil. One of the country’s biggest landowners, the Molina family, introduced the African palm to replace their cotton crops in the late 1980s. But the region was still mostly cattle country. Since the 1960s, about half of the once densely forested Petén had been cleared for livestock. In a familiar approach, ranches big and small capitalized on preferential government programs and adopted aggressive tactics to acquire land. But while ranchers purchased land family by family, the palm companies that followed could buy up entire villages. Between 2003 and 2013, land for palm oil cultivation almost quadrupled across the country. Today, Guatemala is the world’s sixth largest palm oil producer, exporting about 80 percent of its palm crops as crude oil to Mexico and a handful of European countries.

“We’re surrounded by palms on all sides,” Hernández says. “Everywhere.”

Across Sayaxché, across the Petén, these palms replaced and repurposed, if not completely, former cattle ranches. But the plantations have also absorbed land that was once used to grow maize and beans as part of the milpa crop system, or land that was left to fallow between harvests. In Sayaxché today, farming for crops like corn, beans, and plantains is no more than a memory, Hernández says. But it would be remiss to say that the Petén is barren, empty, or untended. Palm plantations have replicated the idea of a forest in much the same way that industrial agriculture has redefined what it is to feed people. Both use the illusion of abundance to mask extractive practices that undermine local food production.

At the café in Sayaxché, just four blocks from the Pasión’s edge, Hernández maps out the river and its tributaries, tracing an outline across a woven pink and red tablecloth. Green-gray and sinuous, the Pasión ripples, wrinkles, and unfolds for some two hundred miles across the Petén. It originates from north-flowing headwaters that skirt Sayaxché and tend westward before feeding into Mexico’s Usumacinta River. In Sayaxché, where there is no bridge that spans the river’s wide banks, people are ferried across on painted wooden boats, while cars and trucks—loaded with cows or bunches of red palm fruit—are carried by barge. Not so long ago, Hernández says, the river was filled with all types of fish, good fish, the kind that communities living along the water’s edge hedged their livelihoods against. But seven years ago, all of that changed.

The Pasión of Petén

In June 2015, during the Petén’s rainy season, the oxidation ponds at a local palm plantation and mill overflowed, spilling a biocidal blend of the insecticide malathion and palm effluent into the waterway. Palm effluent is made up of organic waste generated by the process of turning palm fruit into oil. Left untreated, it is one hundred times more polluting than domestic sewage. Soon there were thousands of dead fish carpeting the surface of the Pasión and a foul stench hanging in the air. Rigoberto Lima Choc, a twenty-eight-year-old schoolteacher and activist, was among the first to witness and document the destruction. One hundred miles of the Pasión were poisoned. Twenty-three fish species were decimated. And a score of indigenous communities, reliant on fish they could no longer catch, were ruined. Across Sayaxché, a new term emerged: ecocide.

It is the fortune of a few pitted against the burden of many. And the palm oil industry is nothing if not rapacious.

Over the following months, mounting evidence traced the spill back to the largest palm producer in the area, Reforestadora de Palma del Petén S.A, or REPSA. Owned by the Molina family as a subsidiary of the agro-industrial company Grupo HAME, REPSA occupies about 10 percent of the land in the Sayaxché municipality. While land is power in Guatemala, especially when its unequal distribution favors the rich, activists including Hernández and Lima Choc demanded that the company be held accountable, if not permanently closed. In September 2015, three months after the spill, a Guatemalan judge ordered REPSA to temporarily cease operations while an investigation took place.

It never happened. The following day, three activists were kidnapped while on their way to Sayaxché. In town, six hundred REPSA workers, aggrieved by the proposed closure and possibility of a mass dismissal, held those inside a local government building hostage. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights called for the government, at any level, to intervene. But there was no response. Around midday, when the sun was at its highest, Lima Choc was gunned down outside Sayaxché’s Courthouse of Peace. The masked assailants fled on motorbike. The kidnapped activists and the hostages were released. REPSA denied any involvement, and no one was ever charged.

Over the next three years, as Nestlé and U.S. food giant Cargill severed ties with REPSA, the company embarked on a sweeping public relations campaign. It adopted a policy on non-violence and intimidation, established a sustainability plan, and produced a twelve-minute video shirking responsibility for the contamination of the Pasión, instead laying blame on riverside communities. A Sayaxché tourism website, created a year after the ecocide but with no overt ties to REPSA, regurgitated the company’s talking points. Posts on the site asserted that the pollution of the Pasión was an opportunity, not a crisis; others accused human rights activists of hate speech; and two exalted Lima Choc as a local hero while blaming his death on “falling in love with the least convenient person.”

REPSA’s revisionism has mostly succeeded. It has not been held legally accountable for the contamination of the Pasión nor admitted to any wrongdoing. Over the past three years, some of the corporations that cut ties with the company have reinstated them. Activists, meanwhile, continue to organize. But the violence in Sayaxché has made many a little more cautious. At our café table in the heart of town, Hernández speaks in a low, quiet voice, his words coming out just above a whisper.

“We are continuing to defend,” he says. “But we have to be more careful—where there’s palm, there’s violence.”

And, as I am told, the companies have ears everywhere.

Certified Cruelty

About thirty miles to the southwest of Sayaxché’s center, where the Chixoy river carves out a border with Mexico, the microregion of Tierra Blanca begins. Potholed streets, flooded from a morning downpour, are surrounded by languid dogs, brightly painted concrete stores, and sprawling palm plantations that operate under the dominion of the company Palmas del Ixcán. It is mid-October when I visit, hot and humid, and the air is swollen with listless mosquitoes.

At a sky-blue home in the village of Roto Viejo, I meet Vicente Pérez Ramírez, another leader of the COCODE. From his kitchen-cum-living room, a television plays a muted telenovela while Ramírez tells me about a meeting he was invited to three months earlier in Rubelsanto, about two hours away. Local leaders from across the region had been gathered to discuss Palmas del Ixcán. A “professional woman,” as Ramírez describes her, wanted to know what impact the company had had on their communities. No one from Palmas del Ixcán was present nor listening, they were told. The community leaders could speak freely. And their list of grievances ran long.

Since the plantations moved into the area about fifteen years ago, once more using intimidation and encirclement to buy land—including Ramírez’s small plot—the community’s conditions had worsened. Every summer, the nearby lake, shaped like a waxing crescent moon, is nearly drained to satiate thirsty palms. Flies, which many in the community believe are linked to the plantation, have descended in hordes. Workers, both local and migratory, are paid poorly, fired easily, and have to wade through deep drainage ditches of water laced with chemicals to meet daily quotas. Around the time of the meeting in Rubelsanto, the San Román River had been polluted, fish floating to its surface.

“The companies have only harmed the communities,” Ramírez says. “That’s their intention.”

The meeting had been held to discuss the potential certification of Palmas del Ixcán as a producer of sustainable palm oil. Since the mid-2000s, when deforestation and the demise of the Sumatran orangutan shone a light on the problems across Southeast Asia’s palm oil industry, demands for a more sustainable product have been addressed by the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, or the RSPO. Made up of different members from across the palm oil industry—growers, manufacturers, investors, and nonprofit organizations—the RSPO uses social and environmental criteria to assess whether a company produces what they deem “Certified Sustainable Palm Oil.”

Certification is a process that can take several months. It involves independent audits and community meetings such as the one Ramírez attended. About 19 percent of the world’s palm oil production has been certified sustainable by the RSPO, including more than ninety-five thousand hectares of palm-producing land in Guatemala. On paper, the global initiative looks both effective and commendable. But across palm-bound communities, in villages without water, in the homes of locals and land defenders, the reality is more complicated.

At Ramírez’s home in Roto Viejo, where a few boisterous roosters crow through the midday heat, we are joined by Raul—another community leader, who has asked that I only use his first name. Ramírez is part of the COCODE at the town level; Raul represents the twenty-two mostly indigenous Q’eqchi’ communities that make up the Tierra Blanca microregion. Like Ramírez, he attended the RSPO meeting about Palmas del Ixcán and, alongside leaders from two municipalities and two other microregions, signed his name to a letter addressed to the RSPO’s independent auditors. The letter detailed the damage caused to their communities by Palmas del Ixcán and listed recommendations for what should happen next: no new plantations; relocating a palm processing mill; reviewing work quotas for laborers; speaking with affected communities. And do NOT—as the signatories capitalized—certify Palmas del Ixcán.

After the meeting and the letter, Raul was approached by someone he knew worked for the company, who invited him to share a soda at a local tienda. Raul obliged, though he suspected it would not be a friendly encounter. The man listed Raul’s comings and goings from the municipal building, where he often went for work. In his hand, he carried a list of names, and Raul noticed his was marked. Without hesitation, he told the man he knew he was being investigated and intimidated by the company. But he had done nothing wrong. As a community leader, Raul always says, you “cannot serve two masters.” It is the plantations, or it is the people. And he will always choose the people.

“We are the owners of the land. They see us as enemies,” Raul says of companies like Palmas del Ixcán.

In Roto Viejo, as the smell of lunch brings the conversation to a close, Ramírez questions why someone from the RSPO—from their Guatemala office, from overseas, from anywhere—doesn’t visit communities like his. If they did, he says, they would see what is happening. It is the failure of a top-down system like the RSPO that the needs of corporations and investors trump the voices of those quite literally living in the shadow of the palm oil industry. It may be inconvenient for an entire agribusiness to address, if not atone for, the sins of the past, but it is much more onerous to live among the plantations, devoured by monoculture, and reckon with a world that is convinced it is trying.

“Who will the RSPO believe?” Ramírez asks, before I leave his home. “Will they believe the palm companies or our communities?”

In early 2020, Palmas del Ixcán was certified sustainable. The audit report states there is “a good relationship between company and communities.” The RSPO is not serving two masters. They have made their choice. And Ramirez? He has his answer.

Chronicles of Deaths Foretold

On the road back to Sayaxché—away from the serpentine border with Mexico, past the mountain massif of the Sierra de Chinajá, and due north toward Palestina II—the avarice of the palm oil industry feels palpable. Plantations, some secured with guards, line the roads. Gondolas, piled high with bunches of palm fruit, trundle past. A truck carrying agrochemicals, as a warning sign indicates, turns into the entrance of a REPSA plantation. Workers with machetes strapped to their backs drag their feet under the weight of the sun. Faded billboards pitched outside of schools and tiny roadside towns insist: we built this, we did this, we paid for this.

In the palm oil industry, image control is a means of survival, and what is said can be even more nefarious than what is done.

Guatemala has become Latin America’s leading producer of RSPO-certified palm oil, with more than half the land cultivated for palm production now deemed “sustainable.” But across the country, from the furthest reaches of the west to the occupied terrain of the east, what differentiates the alleged good from the quotidian slash-and-burn remains imperceptible.

At the beginning of 2020, about twelve miles from Ramírez’s home in Roto Viejo, two hundred families, mostly former Q’eqchi’ palm workers, settled on plantation land owned by Industria Chiquibul S.A. The occupation—part protest, part land reclamation—came after years of exploitative labor practices, widespread across Chiquibul plantations, left workers without the wages and benefits to which they were entitled. Three months in, the company’s private security guards attempted to forcibly evict the community, shooting at residents and injuring thirty-year-old Izáis Tiul Pop. Four human rights defenders from the occupation were later sentenced to four years in prison on charges including “aggravated usurpation.”

In the town of Chinebal, some seven hours to the southeast, close to the borders of Belize and Honduras, another land dispute reached a crescendo in late 2020. Police officers forcibly evicted a Q’eqchi’ community who had been occupying contested land claimed by the RSPO-certified company NaturAceites. Against a landscape of palm stumps and wooden homes, police fired tear gas and ammunition at about a hundred families, many fleeing to the nearby mountains to escape. Amid the eviction, José Choc Chamán, a local father and husband, was killed. A year later, NaturAceites, assisted by police, forcibly evicted the Q’eqchi’ once more. This time, they set fire to their homes and their belongings. Orange flames and dark plumes of smoke rose above the palms.


The resplendent quetzal, a Mayan symbol of freedom and the namesake of Guatemala’s currency, was once believed to die in captivity. Unable to soar over the mountains and cloud forests of Alta Verapaz, it would become a shell of all that it was and could be. While it has since adapted to a zoo environment, the quetzal is now near threatened in the wild—another casualty of a land rendered unrecognizable by agribusiness and industry.

Across that same landscape, amid the palms, the plantations, and the excess of corporate plundering, land defenders are also threatened. But they know there is no future in an economy built on both their exploitation and their erasure. So they defend their rivers and lakes, they resist the abuse of their labor, they reject the false promises being sold to them as truth, and they fight, as Raul in Tierra Blanca says, even if the price of freedom is their lives.

So, too, does the quetzal persist, carving out a home for itself—a place to mate, a place to sing—and rises above the canopy, a shock of green and a streak of red against a misty sky. The sacrificed do not have to surrender.

 

This story was produced with support from the UC Berkeley 11th Hour Food and Farming Journalism Fellowship.

Sunday, 29 May 2022

The Back of the World


The troubling genius of G. K. Chesterton.
Chesterton is the great critic of homogenization but his localism had an ugly side.
Chesterton is the great critic of homogenization, but his localism had an ugly side.Photograph by Howard Coster / Mary Evans Picture Library

This year is the hundredth anniversary of G. K. Chesterton’s “The Man Who Was Thursday,” and it has come out in at least two new editions on the occasion. “The Man Who Was Thursday” is one of the hidden hinges of twentieth-century writing, the place where, before our eyes, the nonsense-fantastical tradition of Lewis Carroll and Edward Lear pivots and becomes the nightmare-fantastical tradition of Kafka and Borges. It is also, along with Chesterton’s “The Napoleon of Notting Hill,” the nearest thing that this masterly writer wrote to a masterpiece.

Chesterton is an easy writer to love—a brilliant sentence-maker, a humorist, a journalist of endless appetite and invention. His aphorisms alone are worth the price of admission, better than any but Wilde’s. Even his standard-issue zingers are first-class—“Americans are the people who describe their use of alcohol and tobacco as vices”; “There is more simplicity in the man who eats caviar on impulse than in the man who eats grape-nuts on principle”; “ ‘My country, right or wrong,’ is a thing that no true patriot would think of saying. . . . It is like saying, ‘My mother, drunk or sober’ ”—while the deeper ones are genuine Catholic koans, pregnant and profound: “Blasphemy depends on belief, and is fading with it. If anyone doubts this, let him sit down seriously and try to think blasphemous thoughts about Thor.” Or: “The function of the imagination is not to make strange things settled, so much as to make settled things strange.” Or: “A key has no logic to its shape. Its logic is: it turns the lock.”

But he is a difficult writer to defend. Those of us who are used to pressing his writing on friends have the hard job of protecting him from his detractors, who think he was a nasty anti-Semite and medievalizing reactionary, and the still harder one of protecting him from his admirers, who pretend that he was not. His Catholic devotees are legion and fanatic—the small Ignatius Press has taken on the heroic job of publishing everything he wrote in a uniform edition, and is already up to the thirty-fifth volume—but not always helpful to his non-cult reputation, especially when they insist on treating his gassy Church apologetics as though they were as interesting as his funny and suggestively mystical Christian allegories. He has a loving following among liberal Catholics, like Garry Wills and Wilfrid Sheed, and even nonbelievers, like Martin Gardner. But his most strenuous advocates are mainly conservative preVatican II types who are indignant about his neglect without stopping to reflect how much their own uncritical enthusiasm may have contributed to it.

Chesterton is one of that company of writers whom we call Edwardian (though they stretch back to the last years of Victoria), a golden generation that emerged in the eighteen-nineties with personas seeming as fully formed as the silent comedians of the Mack Sennett studio, complete with style, costume, and gesture. Writing in London at a time when hundreds of morning newspapers and as many magazines competed for copy, and where mass literacy had created a mass audience without yet entirely removing respect for intellect, they made themselves as much as they made their sentences. We see them as we read them: Shaw all crinkled, beaming rationality, Kipling beetle-browed, bespectacled imperial intensity. Chesterton embodied the hearty side of mysticism, cape thrown across his shoulders, broad-brimmed hat on his head and sword-stick at his side, a hungry Catholic Pantagruel in London. (The last generation of writers who had anything like the same signature presence were the Americans who first encountered television, in the fifties—Mailer and Capote and Vidal—and for the same reason: they lent prestige to a new mass medium that hadn’t yet learned how easily it could get along without them.)

Chesterton’s autobiography, begun in the late twenties and published just after his death, in 1936, tells his early story more or less accurately. Born into a conventional and unreligious family in suburban London in 1874, he had an extraordinary sensitivity to the secret life of things. In a chapter titled “The Man with the Golden Key,” perfect in its delicate unwinding of the tension between truth and play in a child’s life, he explains that the transforming event of his early life was watching puppet shows in a toy theatre that his father had made for him. (The man with the golden key was a prince whose purpose he can no longer recall in a play whose plot he can no longer remember; but the purposefulness and romance of the figure stay with him.) Chesterton’s point is that childhood is not a time of illusion but a time when illusion and fact exist (as they should) at the same level of consciousness, when the story and the world are equally numinous:

If this were a ruthless realistic modern story, I should of course give a most heart-rending account of how my spirit was broken with disappointment, on discovering that the prince was only a painted figure. But this is not a ruthless realistic modern story. On the contrary, it is a true story. And the truth is that I do not remember that I was in any way deceived or in any way undeceived. The whole point is that I did like the toy theatre even when I knew it was a toy theatre. I did like the cardboard figures, even when I found they were of cardboard. The white light of wonder that shone on the whole business was not any sort of trick. . . . It seems to me that when I came out of the house and stood on the hill of houses, where the roads sank steeply towards Holland Park, and terraces of new red houses could look out across a vast hollow and see far away the sparkle of the Crystal Palace (and seeing it was juvenile sport in those parts), I was subconsciously certain then, as I am consciously certain now, that there was the white and solid road and the worthy beginning of the life of man; and that it is man who afterwards darkens it with dreams or goes astray from it in self-deception. It is only the grown man who lives a life of makebelieve and pretending; and it is he who has his head in a cloud.

The other epiphany concerned limits, localism. “All my life I have loved edges; and the boundary line that brings one thing sharply against another,” he writes. “All my life I have loved frames and limits; and I will maintain that the largest wilderness looks larger seen through a window. To the grief of all grave dramatic critics, I will still assert that the perfect drama must strive to rise to the higher ecstasy of the peepshow.” The two central insights of his work are here. First, the quarrel between storytelling, fiction, and reality is misdrawn as a series of illusions that we outgrow, or myths that we deny, when it is a sequence of stories that we inhabit. The second is not that small is beautiful but that the beautiful is always small, that we cannot have a clear picture in white light of abstractions, but only of a row of houses at a certain time of day, and that we go wrong when we extend our loyalties to things much larger than a puppet theatre. (And this, in turn, is fine, because the puppet theatre contains the world.)

This vision, not yet specifically religious, though determinedly antimaterialist, helped launch Chesterton into the world that he went out to conquer. After a failed attempt at art school and a flirtation with politics, he began, at the turn of the century, writing pop journalism. He was an immediate hit. (He wrote a regular column for the Illustrated London News for more than a quarter century.) He was a big man: six feet four, and constantly expanding outward, from too much food and ale. Bernard Shaw liked to refer to Chesterton and his close friend the Catholic poet and philosopher Hilaire Belloc as if they were a single right-wing Carrollian monster, the Chesterbelloc. (Appearance is the great sorter-out of literary fame; it is hard to become an iconic writer without first looking like an icon.)

A certain kind of fatuous materialist progressivism was ascendant—the progressivism of Shaw and Wells and Beatrice and Sidney Webb, which envisaged a future of unending technological advance. The illusions of faith would be dispelled in an empire of slow-chewed spinach, rational spelling, and workers’ reading circles. Against this, the young Chesterton’s themes, the superiority of the local and the primacy of the imaginary, were irresistible. As he recognized, the papers wanted what they always want: the passionate assertion of the opposing point, the unexpected view in clown makeup, the contrarian as comedian. And that he gave, understanding perfectly the role he was to play. He could appeal to heaven, but he never put on airs. Discussing the “mystery” of his Fleet Street success, he wrote, “I have a notion that the real advice I could give to a young journalist, now that I am myself an old journalist, is simply this: to write an article for the Sporting Times and another for the Church Times, and put them into the wrong envelopes.”

What he had to say came pouring out in essays, poems, and books. (His first book, called “Robert Browning,” had, as he knew, things to say about almost every subject under the sun save the poet. A later book on Dickens, though a little less absent-minded, is really about “The Pickwick Papers” and bits of “Martin Chuzzlewit” and “Nicholas Nickleby.”) He wrote an essay nearly every week, perhaps the best and most characteristic of them, “On Running After One’s Hat,” making the case for the romance of everyday existence:

Most of the inconveniences that make men swear or women cry are really sentimental or imaginative inconveniences—things altogether of the mind. For instance, we often hear grown-up people complaining of having to hang about a railway station and wait for a train. Did you ever hear a small boy complain of having to hang about a railway station and wait for a train? No; for to him to be inside a railway station is to be inside a cavern of wonder and a palace of poetical pleasures. Because to him the red light and the green light on the signal are like a new sun and a new moon. Because to him when the wooden arm of the signal falls down suddenly, it is as if a great king had thrown down his staff as a signal and started a shrieking tournament of trains. I myself am of little boys’ habit in this matter. They also serve who only stand and wait for the two fifteen.

Chesterton’s mysticism always resolves in the close at hand: in a signal light at Paddington station, not in a sunrise over a beach in Tahiti. With a comic touch, he goes on to make a serious point, elevating stories over situations:

A friend of mine was particularly afflicted in this way. Every day his drawer was jammed, and every day in consequence it was something else that rhymes to it. But I pointed out to him that this sense of wrong was really subjective and relative; it rested entirely upon the assumption that the drawer could, should, and would come out easily. “But if,” I said, “you picture to yourself that you are pulling against some powerful and oppressive enemy, the struggle will become merely exciting and not exasperating. Imagine that you are tugging up a lifeboat out of the sea. Imagine that you are roping up a fellow-creature out of an Alpine crevass. Imagine even that you are a boy again and engaged in a tug-of-war between French and English.”. . . I have no doubt that every day of his life he hangs on to the handle of that drawer with a flushed face and eyes bright with battle, uttering encouraging shouts to himself, and seeming to hear all round him the roar of an applauding ring. . . . An adventure is only an inconvenience rightly considered. An inconvenience is only an adventure wrongly considered.

“I can feel the baby kicking.”

Chesterton liked to pair himself, congenially, with Shaw, as his opposite, and he was right to do so, for they were the two most perceptive critics of capitalism in their decade. The chief bourgeois vices are hypocrisy and homogenization. Mercantile capitalist societies profess values that their own appetites destroy; calls for public morality come from the same people who use prostitutes. Meanwhile, the workings of capital turn the local artisan into a maker of mass-produced objects and every high street into an identical strip mall. Shaw is the great critic of the hypocrisy of bourgeois society—its inconsistencies and absurdities, the way it robs the poor and then demands that they be “deserving.” Chesterton is the great critic of its homogenization, the levelling of difference in the pursuit of cash. He is the grandfather of Slow Food, of local eating, of real ale, the first strong mind that saw something evil in the levelling of little pleasures.

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The Devious Mind Behind Wordle

The idea for Chesterton’s first novel, “The Napoleon of Notting Hill,” published in 1904, is an illustration of the principle: Chesterton imagines a future London where medieval clan identity has reasserted itself, so that Notting Hill proudly distinguishes itself from Kensington, and the good yeomen of Chelsea guard their traditions against the interlopers from Battersea. The joy of the book lies in the marriage of Chesterton’s love of feudal romance with his love of the density and mystery of the modern city. And London does bring out his strongest and most eloquent emotions: “A city is, properly speaking, more poetic even than a countryside, for while nature is a chaos of unconscious forces, a city is a chaos of conscious ones. The crest of the flower or the pattern of the lichen may or may not be significant symbols. But there is no stone in the street and no brick in the wall that is not actually a deliberate symbol—a message from some man, as much as if it were a telegram or a post card.” Chesterton’s preference for the small state made him a vehement and, for the time, courageous anti-imperialist. His was one of the leading voices against the Boer War. “The two great movements during my youth and early manhood were Imperialism and Socialism,” he recalled. “Both believed in unification and centralization on a large scale. Neither could have seen any meaning in my own fancy for having things on a smaller and smaller scale.”

“The Napoleon of Notting Hill,” after establishing its beautiful conceit, fritters away some of its energy in frantic plot-turning. Four years later, in “The Man Who Was Thursday,” his other principle, the necessity of the imagination, got fully dramatized. The novel tells the story, in a mood deliberately feverish and overlit—snowstorms over St. Paul’s and prismatic sunsets in the suburbs—of a young poet, Syme, who becomes a policeman in order to pursue an international circle of anarchists who have embarked on a nihilistic war against civilization. The anarchists’ leaders, following Poe’s principle of the purloined letter—that no one notices the obvious—meet openly on a balcony overlooking Leicester Square. Each has taken as a code name a day of the week. Syme, after infiltrating the group, becomes Thursday; its chief is the dreadful Sunday. Syme discovers that the group is plotting a bombing in Paris, and sets off to stop it. As he races through England and across the Channel, he discovers that the entire circle of anarchists is really made up of undercover policemen, including the sinister-seraphic Sunday, who is, somewhat mystically, both the ultimate anarchist and the leading cop—the two faces of the deity, as Chesterton seems to have imagined him then.

At times wonderfully funny, at times frightening, the book is filled with what we would now call existential panic, rendered not in an intuitive, dreamlike way, as in Carroll’s “Jabberwocky” or “The Hunting of the Snark,” but made to disturb through the invocation of a world almost but not quite like our own. It is a Surrealist atmosphere, in the sense that the awful and the extraordinary don’t intrude on the normal but rise from the normal—are the normal in another dimension. (Here Kafka and Borges are implicit; Chesterton must have influenced both.) In “The Man Who Was Thursday,” he recaptures a childhood sense of what it feels like to be frightened by a nothing that is still a something, and by the sense that ordinary things hold intimations of another world, that the crack in the teacup opens a lane to the land of the dead so easily that the dead are already in the living room, pouring out of the broken porcelain. The book is also stippled with small epigrammatic moments, as when Syme comes upon an anarchist poet, Gregory, standing by a street lamp (“whose gleam gilded the leaves of the tree that bent out over the fence behind him”) on a silent, starlit street:

“I was waiting for you,” said Gregory. “Might I have a moment’s conversation?”

“Certainly. About what?” asked Syme in a sort of weak wonder.

Gregory struck out with his stick at the lamp-post, and then at the tree.

“About this and this,” he cried; “about order and anarchy. There is your precious order, that lean, iron lamp, ugly and barren; and there is anarchy, rich, living, reproducing itself—there is anarchy, splendid in green and gold.”

“All the same,” replied Syme patiently, “just at present you only see the tree by the light of the lamp. I wonder when you would ever see the lamp by the light of the tree.”

The really startling thing in the book is Chesterton’s imagining of the anarchists as philosopher-demons. It’s easy to forget just how scary anarchists could seem at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the previous quarter century, they had killed a French President, an American President, and the Russian Tsar, and had bombed the Royal Greenwich Observatory, near London. (The same score now—Sarkozy, Bush, Putin, and the London Eye—and we’d all be under martial law.) “Anarchism,” for Chesterton, has the same resonance that “terrorism” has for English writers like Amis and Hitchens exactly a century later: it represents a kind of vengeful, all-devouring nihilism that is assumed to be pervasive and—this is the crucial thing—profoundly seductive, sweeping through whole classes, of intellectuals, or immigrants, or, especially, immigrant intellectuals. Chesterton’s portrait of Syme could be a portrait of the “awakened” post-9/11 liberal: “He did not regard anarchists, as most of us do, as a handful of morbid men, combining ignorance with intellectualism. He regarded them as a huge and pitiless peril, like a Chinese invasion. He poured perpetually into newspapers and their wastepaper baskets a torrent of tales, verses and violent articles, warning men of this deluge of barbaric denial. . . . There was no anarchist with a bomb in his pocket so savage and solitary as he.”

Chesterton thinks the anarchist’s hatred of bourgeois materialism is so obviously attractive, comes so near to the divine, that it is the truest evil. Only an act of strong will can resist it. Where the ordinary liberal scoffs at the idea that apocalyptic terror represents a real threat to his society, the awakened humanist, like Syme the poet-policeman or Chesterton himself, believes that everyone else has missed the reality, by refusing to accept how plausible and alluring the argument for destruction is. To anyone “awakened” in this way, people who hold the alternative normal view—that there is nothing much to be frightened of—are literally insane. They cannot see what is in front of their noses even as it blows up their cities. The nightmarish intensity of “The Man Who Was Thursday” derives from this conviction. Only cops and criminals are really alive.

Yet Chesterton still had his wits about him, and recognizes, at the end of his book, that the demon-terrorists are largely a projection of the policeman’s mind. Or is it, perhaps, that the anarchists, who are really policemen, secretly wish to be anarchists? This double vision, where the appetite for romantic violence is imagined as the flip side of the desire for absolute order, gives the book its permanence. It ends with a powerful and strange image of reality itself as two-sided:

“Listen to me,” cried Syme with extraordinary emphasis. “Shall I tell you the secret of the whole world? It is that we have only known the back of the world. We see everything from behind and it looks brutal. That is not a tree, but the back of a tree. That is not a cloud, but the back of a cloud. Cannot you see that everything is stopping and hiding a face? If we could only get round in front—”

Given that longing, it was as obvious that Chesterton was headed to Rome as it was that Wilde was headed to Reading jail. If you want a solution, at once authoritarian and poetic, to the threat of moral anarchism, then Catholicism, which built Chartres and inspired Dante, looks a lot better than Scotland Yard. If you want stability allied to imagination, Catholicism has everything else beat. Although Chesterton did not officially convert until 1922, well after the war, his drift toward what he called “Orthodoxy” was apparent in the years just after the publication of “The Man Who Was Thursday.”

And right around here is where the Jew-hating comes in. A reader with a casual interest in Chesterton’s life may have a reassuring sense, from his fans and friendly biographers, that his antiSemitism really isn’t all that bad: that there’s not much of it; that a lot of it came from loyalty to his younger brother Cecil, a polemical journalist in the pre-war years, and to his anti-Dreyfusard friend Belloc; that he had flushed it out of his system by the mid-twenties; and, anyway, that it was part of the time he lived in, a time when pretty much everyone, from Kipling to T. S. Eliot, mistrusted Jews—when even the philo-Semites (give them a home!) were really anti-Semites (get them out of here!).

Unfortunately, a little reading shows that there’s a lot of it, that it comes all the time, and that the more Chesterton tries to justify it the worse it gets. The ugliness really began in 1912, when he joined his brother in a crusade against the corruption of the Liberal Government, using a scandal that involved Rufus Isaacs, a Cabinet minister, and his brother Godfrey, a businessman. The affair, then called the Marconi Scandal (it had to do with what would now be called insider trading in a wireless-telegraph company), implicated non-Jews, too—David Lloyd George, for one—but the nasty heart of the accusations was directed by the Chestertons against the Isaacs brothers, who were not only corrupt but alien. Eventually, Godfrey Isaacs sued Cecil Chesterton, successfully, for libel.

This campaign—and, perhaps, the courtroom loss as well—set off something horrible in the older brother, and, after Cecil died, in 1918, in the war, Chesterton’s hatreds became ugly and obsessive. There had been mild Jew-bashing in his work before, based on the ethnic generalities that everyone engaged in—the Jews are all alike in his stories, but then the French and the Italians are all alike, too. From then on, however, Chesterton hammers relentlessly at the idea that there is “a Jewish problem,” the problem being that Jews are foreigners, innately alien to the nations into which they’ve insinuated themselves. Writing in 1920, he tells us that Jews are regarded, by the Arabs in Palestine, as “parasites that feed on a community by a thousand methods of financial intrigue and economic exploitation.” Chesterton then adds that this charge may not be entirely true but needs to be addressed by the Jews—as though they were compelled to consider themselves permanently on trial by their persecutors. Later in the decade, writing about a journey to America, he says, in defense of Henry Ford, “No extravagance of hatred merely following on experience of Jews can properly be called a prejudice. . . . These people of the plains have found the Jewish problem exactly as they might have struck oil; because it is there, and not even because they were looking for it.”

It’s a deeply racial, not merely religious, bigotry; it’s not the Jews’ cupidity or their class role—it’s them. In his autobiography, Chesterton tries to defend himself by explaining what it is that makes people naturally mistrust Jews. All schoolboys recognized Jews as Jews, he says, and when they did so “what they saw was not Semites or Schismatics or capitalists or revolutionists, but foreigners, only foreigners that were not called foreigners.” Even a seemingly assimilated Jew, in Chesterton’s world, remains a foreigner. No one born a Jew can become a good Englishman: if England had sunk into the Atlantic, he says, Disraeli would have run off to America. The more he tries to excuse himself, the worse it gets. In his autobiography, he writes of how he appreciates that “one of the great Jewish virtues is gratitude,” and explains that he knows this because as a kid at school “I was criticized in early days for quixotry and priggishness in protecting Jews; and I remember once extricating a strange swarthy little creature with a hooked nose from being bullied, or rather being teased.”

“I need it yesterday.”

The insistence that Chesterton’s anti-Semitism needs to be understood “in the context of his time” defines the problem, because his time—from the end of the Great War to the mid-thirties—was the time that led to the extermination of the European Jews. In that context, his jocose stuff is even more sinister than his serious stuff. He claims that he can tolerate Jews in England, but only if they are compelled to wear “Arab” clothing, to show that they are an alien nation. Hitler made a simpler demand for Jewish dress, but the idea was the same. Of course, there were, tragically and ironically, points of contact between Chesterton and Zionism. He went to Jerusalem in 1920 and reported back on what he found among the nascent Zionists, whom he liked: he wanted them out of Europe and so did they; he wanted Jews to be turned from rootless cosmopolitans into rooted yeomen, and so did they.

Chesterton wasn’t a fascist, and he certainly wasn’t in favor of genocide, but that is about the best that can be said for him—and is surely less of a moral accomplishment than his admirers would like. He did speak out, toward the end of his life, against the persecution in Nazi Germany, writing that he was “appalled by the Hitlerite atrocities,” that “they have absolutely no reason or logic behind them,” that “I am quite ready to believe now that Belloc and I will die defending the last Jew in Europe.” Yet he insisted, “I still think there is a Jewish problem,” and he denounced Hitler in the context of a wacky argument that Nazism is really a form of “Prussianism,” which is really a form of Judaism; that is, a belief in a chosen, specially exalted people. (For what it’s worth, although he mistrusts Judaism, he detests Islam; Judaism is merely pre-Christian but Islam is a kind of parody Christianity. All the favorite historical arguments for Jesus—that he had to be either crazy or right, and he doesn’t seem crazy; that he changed the world with a suddenness not plausible in an ordinary human; that the scale of the edifice he inspired is proof of divine inspiration—apply just as well to Muhammad, and they can’t both be the guy.)

The trouble for those of us who love Chesterton’s writing is that the anti-Semitism is not incidental: it rises from the logic of his poetic position. The anti-Semitism is easy to excise from his arguments when it’s explicit. It’s harder to excise the spirit that leads to it—the suspicion of the alien, the extreme localism, the favoring of national instinct over rational argument, the distaste for “parasitic” middlemen, and the preference for the simple organ-grinding music of the folk.

His defenders insist that, whatever harm he did to himself and his reputation by his prejudices, the often long, always didactic, and specifically Catholic books to which he devoted himself after his conversion more than make up for it, since they are both profound and genuinely universal, insisting on a pan-national commonality in the true faith. I have had these books—“The Everlasting Man,” a study of Jesus and Christianity; his life of St. Francis; his defense of Thomas Aquinas—pressed on me by Catholic friends with something like the same enthusiasm with which I have proselytized for the pre-Catholic Chesterton. It is hard for a nonbeliever to evaluate this kind of writing, which, despite its evangelical exhortations, is really written to comfort and encourage the already convinced. We choose a religion, when we do, not for the tenets of a creed but for the totality of a circumstance, for a tone and a practice and an encompassing condition: “It feels like home” (or “like my father’s puppet theatre”) is about the truest thing that the convert can say about his new faith. As Chesterton would have been the first to admit, nobody has to argue so strenuously for what he actually believes. Nobody gets up on a soapbox and shouts about the comfort of his sofa and chairs. He just invites other people to sit in them.

In these books, Chesterton becomes a Pangloss of the parish; anything Roman is right. It is hard to credit that even a convinced Catholic can feel equally strongly about St. Francis’s intuitive mysticism and St. Thomas’s pedantic religiosity, as Chesterton seems to. His writing suffers from conversion sickness. Converts tend to see the faith they were raised in as an exasperatingly makeshift and jury-rigged system: Anglican converts to Catholicism are relieved not to have to defend Henry VIII’s divorces; Jewish converts to Christianity are relieved to get out from under the weight of all those strange Levitical laws on animal hooves. The newly adopted faith, they imagine, is a shining, perfectly balanced system, an intricately worked clock where the cosmos turns to tell the time and the cuckoo comes out singing every Sunday. An outsider sees the Church as a dreamy compound of incense and impossibility, and, overglamorizing its pretensions, underrates its adaptability. A Frenchman or an Italian, even a devout one, can see the Catholic Church as a normally bureaucratic human institution, the way patriotic Americans see the post office, recognizing the frailty and even the occasional psychosis of its employees without doubting its necessity or its ability to deliver the message. Chesterton writing about the Church is like someone who has just made his first trip to the post office. Look, it delivers letters for the tiny price of a stamp! You write an address on a label, and they will send it anywhere, literally anywhere you like, across a continent and an ocean, in any weather! The fact that the post office attracts timeservers, or has produced an occasional gun massacre, is only proof of the mystical enthusiasm that the post office alone provides! Glorifying the postman beyond what the postman can bear is what you do only if you’re new to mail.

The books became narrower as they got bigger. The problem of how you reconcile a love of the particular with a set of universal values seemed easy; the Catholic Church was large enough to provide a universal code and ritual for life with plenty of room for variation among lives within it. The trouble is that Catholic universalism is not so convincing to those whose idea of local variation involves a variation on the Catholic ritual, or wanting some other ritual, or wanting no ritual at all. Chesterton’s vision has no room in it for tolerance, except as a likable personal whim or an idiosyncratic national trait. (That he was personally tolerant, on this basis, no one can doubt.) The history of persecution, of Albigensians and Inquisitions, is constantly defended in the inevitable “though it can only be regretted/still it must always be remembered” manner.

The wonderful spirit of early Chesterton—who is equally religious but not so neatly dogmatic—got channelled into the Father Brown detective stories, which he wrote for money and from increasingly flagging inspiration, and into the torrent of weekly journalism, which he kept up right until his death. The later essays are often as brilliant as those of the early nineteen-hundreds. Chesterton on the virtues of the newly invented cartoon, on the absurdities of Prohibition in America, on social manners within New York skyscrapers is still wonderful. (Musing on how an American always takes off his hat in an elevator, he writes that the very word “elevator” “expresses a great deal of his vague but idealistic religion,” and he goes on, “Perhaps a brief religious service will be held in the elevator as it ascends; in a few well-chosen words touching the Utmost for the Highest. . . . The tall building is itself artistically akin to the tall story. The very word skyscraper is an admirable example of an American lie.”) But often one has the sense of a man chained to a paradox assembly line in a prose factory. Too much journalism does drain a writer; turns his tics into tocks, dully marking the time until the next check.

And then he seemed very dated very soon. There are two great tectonic shifts in English writing. One occurs in the early eighteenth century, when Addison and Steele begin The Spectator and the stop-and-start Elizabethan-Stuart prose becomes the smooth, Latinate, elegantly wrought ironic style that dominated English writing for two centuries. Gibbon made it sly and ornate; Johnson gave it sinew and muscle; Dickens mocked it at elaborate comic length. But the style—formal address, long windups, balance sought for and achieved—was still a sort of default, the voice in which leader pages more or less wrote themselves.

The second big shift occurred just after the First World War, when, under American and Irish pressure, and thanks to the French (Flaubert doing his work through early Joyce and Hemingway), a new form of aerodynamic prose came into being. The new style could be as limpid as Waugh or as blunt as Orwell or as funny as White and Benchley, but it dethroned the old orotundity as surely as Addison had killed off the old asymmetry. Chestertonian mannerisms—beginning sentences with “I wish to conclude” or “I should say, therefore” or “Moreover,” using the first person plural un-self-consciously (“What we have to ask ourselves . . .”), making sure that every sentence was crafted like a sword and loaded like a cannon—appeared to have come from some other universe. Writers like Shaw and Chesterton depended on a kind of comic and complicit hyperbole: every statement is an overstatement, and understood as such by readers. The new style prized understatement, to be filled in by the reader. What had seemed charming and obviously theatrical twenty years before now could sound like puff and noise. Human nature didn’t change in 1910, but English writing did. (For Virginia Woolf, they were the same thing.) The few writers of the nineties who were still writing a couple of decades later were as dazed as the last dinosaurs, post-comet. They didn’t know what had hit them, and went on roaring anyway.

In the late twenties, many people lost their bearings, and Chesterton began to drift farther right than he had before. Though he never fully embraced Mussolini, he was in spirit as good a Falangist as you could find: he dreamed of an anti-capitalist agricultural state overseen by the Catholic Church and governed by a military for whom medieval ideas of honor still resonated, a place where Jews would not be persecuted or killed, certainly, but hived off and always marked as foreigners. All anti-utopians cherish a secret utopia, an Eden of their own, and his, ironically, was achieved: his ideal order was ascendant over the whole Iberian Peninsula for half a century. And a bleak place it was, too, with a fearful ruling class running a frightened population in an atmosphere of poverty-stricken uniformity and terrified stasis—a lot more like the actual medieval condition than like the Victorian fantasy. (Just as William Morris’s or Ruskin’s medieval guilds were the leisure activities of a Victorian moneyed and altruistic class projected backward in time, Chesterton’s medieval London was really a nostalgic vision of late-Victorian London suburbs, small craftsmen gathered around the village green.)

He died, at the age of sixty-two, in his beloved country town of Beaconsfield (Disraeli had previously been its most illustrious resident), worse for wear after decades of non-stop writing, editing, and lecture-touring. His coffin was too big to be carried down the stairs, and had to be taken through a window. But even in his final years the sinuosity of his mind and the beauty of his line remained strong. (Besides, if obviously great writers were allowed onto the reading list only when they conform to the current consensus of liberal good will—voices of tolerance and liberal democracy—we would probably be down to George Eliot.)

Chesterton’s conundrums of imagination and fact retain their grip on us, because they remind us that we know two things. We know that we have our experience of a limited world, Surbiton or Notting Hill or Telegraph Hill. We also know that this experience doesn’t feel limited, that it includes far more—all of myth and religion and meaning, as the children’s puppet theatre does. The desire for mystery and romance can’t be argued out of importance, but it can’t be willed into existence, either. It is a mistake to believe that the man with the golden key is “only” a puppet when he acts out a story that alters the inside of your head; it is also a mistake to cover your eyes and wish away the strings.

We can take the belief in that puppet to be a delusion, as the rationalists did. Or we can take it to be an intimation, as Chesterton did, of the existence of another world, in which the things that we sense as shadows will become real, and we will see ourselves as puppets that have come alive in the hand of God. Or we can believe that the credit we give the puppet show is the credit it deserves, that the wonder of it cannot be explained, up or down, but only experienced; that the side we see is the side there is to look at, and that the white radiance of wonder shines from inside, which is where the light is. ♦

A State of Nature

A map and a river
The mountains and rain forests of the Colombia-Panama border are a haven for wildlife, for intrepid settlers, and for outlaws.Photograph by Stephen Ferry

The Pan-American Highway runs sixteen thousand miles, from Anchorage to Tierra del Fuego, with one significant interruption: an expanse of rain forest along the border of Colombia and Panama. The road ends abruptly on the Panama side, just north of a national park, and picks up again as a dirt path, sixty miles southeast, in Colombia, in the floodplain of the enormous Atrato River. The region in between, which spans two coasts with jungles and mountains and a confounding web of rivers, is known locally as the Tapón del Darién—the Darién Plug—for its seeming impassability.

In English, it’s called the Darién Gap, the legacy of a nineteenth-century scramble to cut a seafaring channel from the Caribbean to the Pacific. The Prussian explorer Alexander von Humboldt speculated that the Darién isthmus harbored a river passage that need only be expanded to be navigable. In 1850, an Irish physician named Edward Cullen claimed to have walked such a passage without trouble, and his fraudulent assertion—supported by detailed phony maps—sparked a series of expeditions. Four years later, a twenty-seven-man team, led by Lieutenant Isaac Strain, of the United States Navy, set off to find Cullen’s mythical east-west passage. The team got lost within days and was forced to divide; seven men ultimately died. Strain refused to believe the indigenous Kuna who told him that he was going the wrong way, and months later he was found naked and sick, reduced to seventy-five pounds. He deemed Darién “utterly impracticable” for a canal, and engineers looked north to Panama City.

A century later, work stalled on the Darién link of the Pan-American Highway, and the gap came to mean something else: a breach in a road running north to south. American tourists arrived eager to hike it, and backpacking guides offered routes through the Serranía del Darién, the mountain range on the Colombia-Panama border. To automobile companies, the gap became an irresistible venue for publicity stunts. In 1961, a caravan of three red Chevrolet Corvairs took on “the world’s worst roadblock on the world’s greatest highway,” with support teams hacking trails and building bridges. Two of the cars managed to cross the gap; one was left to rust under a ceiba tree.

Scientists were equally attracted to the Darién. For millions of years, the isthmus has filtered the exchange of plants and animals between the Americas, and, as sea levels rose and fell, its mountains isolated populations, resulting in an extraordinary number of unique species. A fifth of its plants occur nowhere else. In 1981, after decades of intense study, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature declared that “thousands of species remain to be discovered.”

But in the late nineteen-nineties the left-wing Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or farc, began fighting right-wing paramilitaries for control of the area. The only people to cross the gap with any frequency were combatants, illegal migrants, and drug gangs. Missionaries and orchid collectors were kidnapped, and, as the gap became synonymous with danger, science and tourism dried up. Los Katíos National Park, on the Colombian side, has been closed for years, owing to clashes among armed groups, who have seeded land mines there.

For a certain type of person, this is all very appealing. In 2003, Robert Young Pelton, the author of “The World’s Most Dangerous Places,” prepared for his own hike through the gap by e-mailing the farc guerrillas and the region’s dominant paramilitary faction. He got no responses, but he was undeterred. At the last minute, he invited two young backpackers to come along, and all three ended up being kidnapped, when they stumbled on Colombian paramilitaries ambushing a small town. The fighters, armed with guns and machetes, killed four Kuna men, but after ten days they released Pelton and his companions unharmed. Pelton credited his wits for their survival. “It’s not really luck,” he told National Geographic News. “You’re in a certain mind-set when you’re kidnapped. You want to win the respect of your captors, so they drop their guard.”

Travel conditions in Colombia have improved since then. Demobilization of paramilitaries, waning farc influence in the countryside, and better Army control of highways have made opportunistic roadblocks rare; kidnappings have decreased dramatically. In 2007, the government began advertising Colombia’s cultural and ecological wonders with the slogan “The only risk is wanting to stay.” Birders were among the first to take up the challenge, keen on adding the country’s seventy-six endemic species to their “life lists” of birds spotted. But even the promise of sooty-capped puffbirds and Tacarcuna wood quails has not enticed them into the roadless Darién Gap.

This March, I travelled with Sergio Tamayo, one of a very few guides offering tours in the gap. He began four years ago, when he was a twenty-four-year-old backpacker—“not a European-style backpacker but a Colombian-style backpacker,” he said, meaning that he worked as he travelled. He cut wood, mostly, and slept in a hammock. One day in San Francisco, a town on the Gulf of Urabá that its residents call San Pacho, Sergio heard some Medellín accents on the beach, and offered to take the visitors to an outlying island. He wrote up an itinerary, charged them twelve dollars apiece, and scrambled to find a boat.

Back in Medellín, he founded his own firm, Ecoaventurax, in an alcove of his mother’s apartment, and designed posters, T-shirts, and cell-phone charms with its logo. He got his chest tattooed with Maori-style designs and recruited customers on Facebook. He prefers people attracted to the gap despite, rather than because of, its dangers, but danger-seekers find him anyway. Two German men recently demanded that he take them to “where the guerrillas are,” and he said that he would take them close enough. The men painted their faces with jagua-fruit ink and posed for photographs in the woods. The majority of his clients, though, are, like him, young Colombians from modest backgrounds eager to experience parts of the country that have long been off limits.

Sergio has no politics to speak of—he was perhaps the only person in Colombia with no opinion about the death of Hugo Chávez—but he seems to have tapped into a broader strain of patriotism; last year’s ad campaign for Suzuki showed urban adventurers driving into the Colombian countryside, maps spread. Our itinerary included all the stops in Sergio’s weeklong gap tour, which he offers twelve times a year. The gap’s highlands remain under guerrilla control, so he takes visitors instead to the jungles and rivers that surround its few settlements: frontier towns, with varying degrees of lawlessness. We would travel northward along the Caribbean coast, through the clustered towns of San Pacho, Triganá, and Acandí, making our way to Capurganá and Sapzurro, at the border.

We started in an open boat from the port town of Turbo, crossing the Gulf of Urabá and heading west over the wide brown mouth of the Atrato River. Turbo is, for commercial purposes, Colombia’s last stop on the Pan-American Highway, and giant banana plantations and cattle ranches flank the road. Police and Army stations are everywhere, a legacy of clashes between paramilitaries and guerrillas. Billboards advertise shopping malls and model homes.

As we approached the western side of the gulf, our boat heaved and smacked along a shoreline probably little changed from when Vasco Nuñez de Balboa first saw it, in 1501: waves exploding against basalt boulders, a drab green curtain of forest broken up by the pink of guayacan trees in bloom. At our first stop, the town of Titumate, there was no dock, and men waded out to collect parcels. Three teen-age girls in tight sparkly tops—prostitutes—were being delivered in a fishing boat, and the men slung them over their shoulders like bags of cement. San Pacho, where we arrived twenty minutes later, did have a dock, and from it the town looked as though it had been built by pirates. Wooden houses jutted erratically from the hills, some of them shaped like ships and bearing tattered flags. Men and boys rode horses along the beach, waving up at Ruthie Laguado Zafra, the owner of a general store whose porch overlooked the sea.

Ruthie, elegant in a satin tunic and sandals, made us tree-tomato juice in a blender powered by a stationary bicycle, churning up a peachy-yellow slush. She dismounted, strained the juice, and served it in glasses. On the shelf behind her bicycle blender sat a pile of books by the Peruvian-American mystic Carlos Castañeda, which she encouraged customers to borrow. Ruthie had arrived here in 2002, with her six children, from a suburb of Medellín. San Pacho, she told me, was only as old as she was—forty-five. It had been colonized by Colombians from the interior, attracted by the forests and the isolation. “We had a dream of our own land,” she said. Now she owned a few acres.

The town had never prospered, she said, only survived. Its hundred and fifty families grew yucca and fished and waited for mangoes to ripen in the trees; some smuggled drugs. “We are so isolated,” she said. “But it’s miraculous to live here. The most amazing things happen.” One day, she was desperate for groceries, about to send one of her boys off with a list of foods to borrow, when a young man arrived leading a burro laden with “the very same items that were on my list!” It was a gift from a friend living over the mountain.

The town had no medical care, phone lines, or Internet. Education was bad, and electricity ran only in the evenings, if it ran at all. Ruthie spent much of her time agitating for elected officials to help San Pacho, or prodding its residents to help one another. She was organizing a bingo fund-raiser for an eight-month-old boy with a kidney tumor.

There were never any police in San Pacho, and Army boats passed its dock without stopping. The local authority was an organized group of drug traffickers, many of them former members of right-wing paramilitaries, who had wrested the coast from farc control in the mid-nineties. When the paramilitaries demobilized, a decade later, their lower ranks regrouped to form mafias. The government gave them a new, apolitical name—bacrim, for bandas criminales emergentes—but everyone in San Pacho still called them paramilitaries.

Ruthie insisted that there were few conflicts. “We don’t hear bullets,” she said firmly. “If there’s a monopoly of one armed group, it’s not a problem. Here, as a single woman, I can walk around any hour of the night without being bothered. I am free.” I asked her why, then, she didn’t go to the paramilitaries for what the town needed. She said that some of her neighbors suggested asking for help for the boy with the tumor, but the child’s father forbade it. When she arrived in San Pacho, it was governed by a paramilitary chief called El Alemán, who was approachable: “Everyone went to him when they were sick.” El Alemán was in jail now. As for the current group, she did not want to owe them any favors.

Advocates of the Pan-American Highway have claimed that it would bring order and prosperity to towns like San Pacho, and, even though Panama and the U.S. long ago lost interest, Colombia has never given up on completing the road. Its government has studied thirteen proposed routes to close the Darién Gap, the most direct of which would tear audaciously through Los Katíos National Park and a park on the Panama side. More likely routes would skirt the parks, running just west of San Pacho. Ruthie didn’t want anything to do with a road. “It would ruin our way of life,” she said.

Sergio and I collected our backpacks and followed a horse path to the concrete-block cabins we were renting for sixteen dollars a night. He felt the way Ruthie did about San Pacho. “It’s like the beginning of life here,” he said, after darkness fell and the cooking fires started. That night, we could hear, over the crashing sea, a hollow popping sound: the hulls of drug boats hitting waves at high speed. I later learned that one of Ruthie’s daughters had been murdered. An investigation turned up no suspects, but people in town said it was the paramilitaries.

The shoreline connecting San Pacho to the small cove town of Triganá was heavily eroded, and as we walked a fragile path above the sea we saw families digging for gold in the exposed cliffs. One man clutched a toucan to his breast as he dug. The miners looked up at us warily; no one is friendly when digging for gold.

Approaching town, we met a fluffy-haired, bare-chested man reclining in an old wooden boat that he’d transformed into a thatched-roof bar. His name was Juan Guillermo Pérez, or Juangui, and Ruthie regarded him as one of the area’s most desirable bachelors. Juangui designed houses and hotels, of which there were several fine examples in Triganá. Some of them were owned by paramilitaries, who were unmistakable once I learned to recognize them. In San Pacho, there were always one or two by the dock, mounted on good horses, keeping an eye on things. In Triganá, they lay in hammocks under mango trees, wearing bright new Nike and Adidas clothes, with cell phones and two-way radios on their chests. Their hair was invariably close-cropped, in contrast to the shipwrecked look of nearly everyone else, and their bodies were different: thicker, better fed.

Sergio introduced Juangui to me as someone who’d crossed the Darién Gap, but Juangui corrected him—he’d tried to cross and failed. He started his journey in 2008 with four friends from Triganá, including a twelve-year-old boy. “We were just doing it for the experience,” he said. They’d left from Panama City and followed the Pan-American Highway to a town called Santa Fe. A Kuna friend had told them how to cross from there, travelling east and south, and they provisioned for three days. In a place called Mortí, they met more Kuna, who were rougher than the Kuna he’d known; there was garbage surrounding their settlement.

After a quick negotiation, three Kuna men agreed to take them into Colombia for a hundred and fifty dollars. The next morning, Juangui’s group was surprised to be met by three different men, who spent the day guiding them through “pure jungle,” Juangui said. The guides then pointed them to a settlement called Mulatupo, told them it was a two-hour walk, and left. This was the same route, albeit in reverse, that Isaac Strain and his men had taken in 1854, and Juangui fared only slightly better. “Mulatupo was actually more than a day away,” he said. “They had tricked us.” The group got lost, and Juangui used his compass to try to get them out, following rivers. They encountered jaguar tracks and a tapir and were chased by peccaries. The boy fished, and they cooked and ate what he caught, but it wasn’t much, and they began to starve. Finally, a Kuna passing by in a boat rescued them. They had never made it out of Panama.

Juangui laughed, and told me that he’d never do it again. He had a friend in Acandí, though, just a kid, who guided Cubans across the gap all the time. Everyone—paramilitaries, guerrillas—was paid off in advance. “You have to be careful talking about that, though,” he added, looking around.

Back in San Pacho, the taps had run dry. This was one of the wettest parts of the world, and yet the town depended on a fickle creek for water. People used kiddie pools as cisterns, dumping bleach in them as a nod to mosquito control, but within a day they were depleted. The weekly merchant boat had yet to arrive with its cases of water and soda, so there was little to drink. We had to find a river if we wanted to bathe, and so we hiked to the closest, fifteen minutes into the jungle.

“On my home planet, I was a deity.”

In a clearing near the banks stood five thatched-roof cabins that looked a good deal posher than the ones we were staying in. They cost sixty dollars a night, Sergio told me, and had been constructed with a United Nations grant to promote ecotourism. They looked vacant. The river beyond them was low, full of tadpoles in isolated pools. Green-and-black poison dart frogs hopped about in the litter, and leaf-cutter ants carried tiny flowers. As we walked, we noticed at a bend far ahead some impish forms disturbing the surface of the water: cotton-top tamarins. Only six thousand of these dainty primates are said to remain in the world, and here a dozen of them had descended from the trees to drink. We edged closer, causing them to steal further upriver. An older male, his splendid, wiglike white crest framing a dubious black face, hung back to assess us.

An hour later, as we left the forest the same way we’d come, we were met by a thickset man with a two-way radio, demanding to know where we’d been. Sergio told him, he nodded, and we passed. A pair of toucans flew by.

How do you promote ecotourism, I asked, when you’ve got thugs standing fifty feet from the eco-cabins? Sergio, usually relaxed and gregarious, grew taciturn. With his clients, he sought to characterize the paramilitaries as you might a snake in your path: harmless unless molested. He knew them, and they left him alone. But he discouraged taking photographs of them, looking at them, or even discussing them. “How incredible were those tamarins!” he said, when he finally spoke.

We left with our packs and climbed twelve mountainous miles toward Balboa, in the interior. The peaks of the Serranía del Darién were shrouded by clouds as we walked along cattle trails, passing into jungle full of dangling heliconia flowers and the macabre calls of howler monkeys. The plan was to follow a river called the Tolo, but on the slick and rocky trail a couple heading the other way warned us that the Tolo had risen and that it was impassable. Though it had barely rained in Balboa, the topography of the region is so varied, and the rainfall so localized, that you can’t predict the state of a river only a few miles away.

We changed course and came to an Emberá settlement, which consisted of a round, thatched, elevated common house, surrounded by rectangular wooden homes with metal roofs. The indigenous Emberá, along with the Kuna and Wounaan, have historically lived on both sides of the border; for centuries they have shared the gap’s rivers and forests with the descendants of Africans who escaped from Spanish slave ships. An Emberá man named Luis Ángel Chavarrí, dressed in jogging clothes, greeted us and invited us to climb up a notched log to his house. There, Sergio stood, his bare chest covered in Maori tattoos, and announced that he had always felt a “particular closeness” with indigenous peoples. Luis Ángel received this politely. He did not mind visitors, he said, as long as they weren’t paramilitaries or guerrillas.

Luis Ángel was in his early thirties, with a calm and earnest manner. His open-sided, single-room house was empty but for two tables and a hammock. From it, we could see the river dragging whole trees along with its force. Twenty-two families lived in this community, he told us. In the nineteen-nineties, all but four had been displaced by guerrillas. In recent years, no armed groups had approached them, except the Army, which they could deal with.

I asked about the Pan-American Highway, whether he thought it would ever be built. His eyes widened. “It’s supposed to go right here!” he said, pointing toward the back aperture of his house. I looked outside and saw only two small thatched-roof sheds. The Emberá didn’t want the road, Luis Ángel said, because their kids, who played on the grassy riverbank, could get hurt or killed. The cattle ranches would expand, and his community would have to move farther into the forest. I’d often heard it argued that a road would help curb drug trafficking; Luis Ángel believed that it would bring the traffic straight to them.

The last overt push for the highway’s construction had come from Colombia’s President Álvaro Uribe, who left office in 2010. The following year, representatives from unesco, the United Nations’ educational, scientific, and cultural arm, came to check on Los Katíos National Park, and reported that even they could not discern whether Colombia intended to build. But the Emberá saw surveyors working. When the government claimed that it was improving an existing road to Acandí, lawyers for Luis Ángel’s community pointed out that there was no existing road to improve; the highway project was being carried out surreptitiously, they argued, in order to evade environmental-impact studies and consultations with indigenous groups. Luis Ángel showed me a lengthy legal document, its pages spotted from the jungle air. It was a writ for protection of constitutional rights. In May, 2011, a court in Bogotá ruled in favor of the Emberá and ordered the plans halted. Luis Ángel received threats. No one believed that this was the last of the road, he said—all the cattlemen wanted it, and the larger towns did, too.

We bought jewelry from the Emberá women, who use tiny glass beads to create delicate collars that lie flat on the skin. One prodded Sergio to bring beads with him on his next trip from Medellín. She tied a string around his wrist with samples of the colors she needed. They had to be Czech beads, not Chinese beads; she was adamant about that.

The high river forced us to backtrack to the coast, and from there we went on to Turbo. We were going to visit the offices of Los Katíos, two hours across the gulf from the park itself, which was off limits. Passing east over the Atrato, we spotted northern screamers, rare marsh birds with goose-like bodies and curved beaks, sitting atop the labyrinthine mangroves. Northern screamers were first recorded here last year, by a friend of Sergio’s, an ecology student from Medellín. The Colombian conflict has kept most international research institutions away from both sides of the gap, leaving intrepid young people to carry out field studies and surveys. Biologists who braved the gap in recent years have made remarkable findings. Some six thousand leatherback-sea-turtle nests—from a huge and previously unknown nesting population—were discovered on a stretch of coast from Acandí into Panama. Researchers in the highlands of Tacarcuna, west of Balboa, discovered nine frogs new to science, including one with orange legs and spikes all over its body.

This year, Juan Sebastián Mejía, a twenty-nine-year-old mammalogist from Bogotá, published results from the first major wildlife study in Los Katíos since 1990. Mejía slept in the park for seven months, using camera traps to track the highly endangered Baird’s tapir. “It’s a beautiful place,” he told me. “When I went to collect my data, I could see spider monkeys, cougars. Every day I saw tracks of jaguars, birds of every kind.” He avoided a section known to be mined. “Obviously, we came in contact with armed groups,” he told me. “But being a Colombian researcher helps—they don’t see you as a target. Someone from the outside, they think there could be money.”

It turned out that the tapirs were thriving in Los Katíos. Photos of the animals, looking stunned by Mejía’s flashbulbs, hung in the park’s offices. Outside, a faded road sign advertised jaguars and waterfalls to a public that hadn’t been allowed inside the park for a decade and a half. Los Katíos, created in 1974 under a joint agreement between Colombia and the United States Department of Agriculture, was originally intended as a kind of barricade. A completed highway, the U.S.D.A. scientists said, would help turn the jungle into a continuous chain of cattle farms—an ideal conduit for foot-and-mouth disease. Breaking the chain would prevent its northward spread. The U.S.D.A. hired biologists to investigate the park’s ecology, and their surveys found more than four hundred species of birds living there. Los Katíos’s human inhabitants, meanwhile, were exiled beyond its borders.

The Pan-American Highway was scheduled to be completed within two years of the park’s creation—President Richard Nixon badly wanted the Darién link done in time for the United States’ bicentennial—but it was dogged by fresh opposition from conservation groups. A federal court halted the construction and demanded impact studies, while conservationists, with the help of unesco, secured better protections for the forests on both sides of the border. The United States, which had paid the bulk of the highway’s construction expenses, ceased funding it in 1979.

In the nineties, the U.S. stopped funding Los Katíos, too. Its staff of thirty rangers had been cut to just a handful by 1997, the year that right-wing paramilitaries entered the Cacarica River, on the southern border of the park. For weeks, they fought farc guerrillas and terrorized the residents, forcing four thousand to flee. The paramilitary leader Freddy Rendón Herrera—“El Alemán,” the patron of San Pacho—set up an illegal logging concern on the Cacarica. The paramilitaries occupied the park, tearing up its structures and burning its library books for cooking fuel. For a decade, they clashed violently with guerillas there. During the worst of the fighting, a ranger was killed by combatants, and the remaining park staff decamped to Turbo. By last year, the paramilitaries had left, and the farc had retreated to one small corner, but the legacy of the fighting remained; in February, 2012, a land mine exploded next to the most spectacular of its waterfalls, killing a man.

Throughout all this, remarkably, Los Katíos has remained in fairly robust ecological shape. The farc, rather than cut its trees, made use of their cover, and recent aerial surveys by the World Wildlife Fund found its vegetation mostly well preserved. The park’s director, Santiago Duarte, a reedy, serious man in silver-rimmed glasses, described for me a variety of ambitious-sounding plans. For years, park staff ignored illegal logging and fishing. Now they were conducting catch studies and monitoring timber extraction. The rangers moved freely in the park again, and Mejía’s tapir study had proved that science could be done there, at least by Colombians.

Duarte said that regional universities were planning more field studies this year. Even though reopening Los Katíos to the public was out of the question, he felt confident, for now, that a highway would not run through the park. “But it could all change tomorrow,” he said.

Acandí’s port was sleepy, full of small fishing boats and dugout canoes, but there were soldiers at its dock, checking papers. The land crossing from Acandí into Panama is by no means easy, but it is relatively short. Illegal migrants on their way north arrive here by boat; in January the drowned bodies of ten were found off Acandí’s coast, where the leatherback turtles come to nest. The dead that could be identified had travelled from Bangladesh, Cuba, and Ecuador. Nepalese immigrants pass through increasingly often, and are said to be among the toughest of the crossers, making the three-day journey without complaint, sustaining themselves on raw rice.

Sergio and I headed into the forest, to an intersection of two rivers that created a deep blue pool which he liked to throw himself into. “Ecotourism” can mean a lot of things, and to Sergio it meant taking an almost spiritual pleasure in geographical wonders: rivers, waterfalls, peaks. We hired two teen-age boys on motorcycles to get us down a long cow path, and they hiked with us contentedly the rest of the way.

The boys and I sat on rocks as Sergio hoisted himself up a cascade. It was here, they told me, that the illegal crossings started, always at night. The migrants walked a day and a half to the border, and another day and a half to meet the Pan-American Highway near Yaviza. The Colombian coyotes hand the immigrants off in the middle, they said; there are Mexicans involved on the other side. These were fast kids, with soccer Mohawks and reggaeton videos on their BlackBerrys, but they could identify all the jungle birds: yellow-rumped caciques, a green kingfisher.

The ride from Acandí to Capurganá, in a narrow boat with fish blood spattered on the backs of the seats, was rough enough to make Sergio—who practiced a rare syncretism of Catholicism and tree hugging—finger through his wallet for his prayer card to the Archangel Raphael. Capurganá and Sapzurro, at the Panama border, are the only towns on the Colombian side of the gap that are mentioned in the Lonely Planet guidebook. After the violence of the nineties, Panama and Colombia began policing them jointly, creating a pocket of safety. Now, twenty miles from the privations of San Pacho, there were hotels with swimming pools and mixed drinks. Bohemian girls from Bolivia and Argentina sold hemp-fibre bracelets to keep themselves in hostel beds and weed. No one had to think twice before taking a photo, and the town’s gaily painted merchant boat, bucking in the surf as men unloaded beer into rowboats, seemed like evidence of the isolation that its barefoot visitors sought, at least for the weekend.

Capurganá and Sapzurro were linked by a forest path, which we hiked to meet a naturalist named Andrés Upegui. He’d directed us to go over the hill and ask for el peludo, the hairy guy. Upegui, whose gray dreadlocks reached his waist, owned a private nature reserve of sixty acres, and had surveyed its bird and plant life himself. In 2010, he’d led an eight-day expedition to the cold and rainy Tacarcuna highlands with ornithologists from Bogotá. Such work required diplomacy; Upegui informed paramilitary chiefs personally, and guerrillas through intermediaries, before embarking. Even so, the trip had to be cut short when guerrillas entered the area, but not before the group located two bird species never before recorded in Colombia.

The Tacarcuna peak, the tallest in the gap, sits just over the border in Panama. It is believed to contain a wealth of unknown species, but, because armed groups have occupied the mountain, it hasn’t been surveyed since the seventies, when the American botanist Alwyn Gentry named several plants there. “I still aspire to climb it,” Upegui said, drinking coffee on his porch, barefoot and shirtless like every other man for miles around. His house was built in the same primitive style as those in San Pacho, but with incongruous touches: windows made of wine bottles, a fresco copied from Gauguin. He had arrived here from Medellín in 1988, in part to escape the city’s escalating violence, and in part because he was inspired by the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre. The Darién Gap, he said, had existed as almost a myth to him—something that suited his youthful philosophy of self-reliant anarchy, of a life that “obliges us to recognize that we are animals, another element of the ecosystem.”

Sapzurro had no docks then, or any commuter boats. Its two hundred inhabitants communicated with the outside world by radio. Upegui dove for lobsters, conch, and crabs, bartering them for yucca and plantains. He carried water from the creeks and built a house. “We were the darlings of the gods,” he told me. Now Sapzurro had twice as many residents, working at hotels, manicured campgrounds, a German restaurant.

Upegui opposed building a road, of course. The Pan-American Highway, he said, is an antiquated dream, a relic of a time of hopeful expansion, of progress and connectedness, that had run smack against the burgeoning environmental movement, against people like him. “But for the people here,” he said, “the road is synonymous with quality of life, and it can be hard for me to argue with them.” The region depended on boats that were expensive and dangerous, sometimes running out of gas, sometimes capsizing from heavy loads. He expected that a road would one day just appear. “The reality of this country is that they will do it when they find it opportune,” he said.

We humped back over the hill to Capurganá. From its highest point, we could see La Miel, the first cove town in Panama. We passed men panning for gold in a stream they’d dammed up, and nobody said hello. That afternoon, we met a couple from Canada, fit trekking types in their fifties who spoke no Spanish at all. They said that they were going to Acandí to watch the turtles nesting, if the sea calmed down enough for their boat to leave. They’d seen sea turtles nesting before, in Costa Rica, and thought it was wonderful.

Sergio was taken aback: these were real ecotourists. He gave them the business card of Acandí’s port hotel and called on their behalf, telling the owners to expect two Canadians and to take them to the turtles. “Speak very slowly,” he admonished them. He called the hotel again that night, to make sure the guests had arrived, and the next morning, to make sure they were alive. They’d seen a turtle, he was told, and they were happy. ♦

In the Land of the Very Old

Jan 23, 2024 — by Sam Toperoff in  Original  for THE SUNDAY LONG READ 1. Passports, or Prescriptions I am writing this in a blue notebook I ...